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ARTICLES

FORCE MAJEURE, FAILURE OF CAUSE
AND THEORIE DE L'IMPREVISION:
LOUISIANA LAW AND BEYOND
Saul Litvinoff*
I.

FORCE MAJEURE

Absolute vs. Relative Impossibility

After a contract is made, a party bound under that contract may
run into obstacles that make his performance impossible. When such is
the case, that party is not liable for any damages that may result from
his failure to perform. That is the doctrine of force majeure which,
with only slight departure from its French ancestor, article 1147 of the
Code Napoleon, was received in article 1933(2) of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870.1 For that doctrine to prevail, however, performance by
the obligor must be truly impossible. In the traditional approach of
French and Louisiana courts, there is force majeure only when the
performance of an obligation becomes absolutely impossible because of
obstacles that the obligor could neither foresee nor resist. 2 An obligor,
in that conception, must honor his signature or his word at any price.
He is bound to employ all his efforts and resources, and even face the
collapse of his business if necessary, in order to perform his obligation.
His diligence, in other words, must be absolute and perfect, regardless
of the magnitude of the increase in physical or financial effort that
unforeseen events or changes in circumstances may require of him in
order to perform, and also regardless of the collapse of his expectations
when such events or changes, without making impossible the performance
Copyright 1985, by Louisiana Law Review.
*

Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1.

La. Civ. Code art. 1933(2) (1870): "Where,

by a fortuitous event or irresistible

force, the debtor is hindered from giving or doing what he has contracted to give or do
or is from the same causes compelled to do what the contract bound him not to do, no
damages can be recovered for the inexecution of the contract." French Civil Code art.

1147: "A debtor is liable for damages arising either from nonperformance or from delay
in the performance of the obligation unless he can show that his failure to perform was
caused by events beyond his control, and further that there was no bad faith on his
part."
2. See 7 M. Planiol & G. Ripert, Trait& pratique de droit civil francais 168-69 (2d
ed. 1954). See also 6 R. Demogue, Trait6 des obligations en g6n~ral 573-74 (1931).
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he promised, deprive him from obtaining the reasonable advantage in
contemplation of which he bound himself to perform.3
Thus, in a Louisiana case where a construction company which
undertook to do excavating work ran into a peculiarly hard subsoil
formation, the court concluded that, under article 1901 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870, agreements legally entered into have the effects of
law for the parties and must be performed in good faith, from where
it follows that a party is obliged to perform a contract if performance
is possible at all, regardless of any difficulty he might experience in
performing it.4 In another case, an owner who had contracted for
additions to his home attempted to dissolve the contract on grounds
that a hurricane had severely damaged the property for which the
additions were intended. Upon finding that the hurricane had not totally
destroyed the home, the Louisiana court concluded that the planned
additions were still possible, though payment by the owner under the
contract was made more difficult and burdensome because the money
he had saved or borrowed for that payment will be needed now to
repair the home. The court expressed sympathy for the home-owner's
predicament, but asserted that the settled jurisprudence of Louisiana is
that the obligor is not released from his duty to perform by the mere
fact that such performance has been made more difficult or more burdensome by a fortuitous event or an irresistibleforce.' In still another
case, a party who had agreed to cut and remove timber within a certain
time alleged that, because of world-wide financial panic and economic
depression, market-values went down in such a way that he was unable
to cut, remove, and market the timber without suffering an unreasonably
great financial loss. The Louisiana court concluded that the alleged
reason did not make the performance impossible but merely rendered
it more difficult, burdensome, and unprofitable, for which causes the
6
party could not be excused.
It must be recognized that such an approach still prevails in the
mind of common law courts also, in spite of the efforts to the contrary
reflected in the doctrines of frustration of contract and commercial
impracticability. 7

3. See 2 H. Mazeaud, Mazeaud & Tunc, Trait6 thdorique et pratique de la responsabilit6 civile d6lictuelle et contractuelle 561-64 (5th ed. 1957).
4. Picard Constr. Co. v. Board of Comm'rs of Caddo Levee Dist., 161 La. 1002,
109 So. 816 (1926). See also Dallas Cooperage & Woodenware Co. v. Creston Hoop Co.,
161 La. 1077, 109 So. 844 (1926).
5. Schenck v. Capri Constr. Co., 194 So. 2d 378, 379-80 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
6. Marionneaux v. Smith, 163 So. 206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935), rehearing denied,
164 So. 456 (La. 1935).
7. See Stroh, The Failure of the Doctrine of Impracticability, 5 Corp. L. Rev. 195
(1982). See also Hawkland, The Energy Crisis and Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 79 Com. L.J. 75 (1974).
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Unless the traditional doctrine of force majeure or impossibility of
performance is reformulated in response to modern economic and commercial realities, the result of applying the strict letter of the law may
be that, in order to perform a contractual obligation, one or more
parties will be required to bear a devastating burden whenever unforeseen
events drastically alter the degree of onerousness the parties contemplated
for the performance at the time the contract was made. That is the
case when situations of vast generality, such as war, international crisis,
inflation, or unprecedented fluctuation of markets, cause an extraordinary increase in prices or extreme scarcity of raw materials.8
Revised article 1873 of the Louisiana Civil Code, providing in its
first paragraph that an obligor is not liable for his failure to perform
when it is caused by a fortuitous event that makes performance impossible, seems to preserve the traditional approach. That article, however, is inserted in a special section now devoted to impossibility of
performance. 9 When read together, the articles in that section disclose
that there exists between impossibility of performance and the theory
of cause a connection that was less explicit in the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870.10 When properly understood, that connection may serve as a
foundation for a more flexible approach to force majeure.
Rebus Sic Stantibus vs. Pacta Sunt Servanda
In Louisiana, absent absolute impossibility, an obligor is bound to
render performance. Some legal systems, however, grant a remedy to
an obligor when, as a consequence of unforeseen events, the performance
he is bound to render becomes excessively onerous. In general terms,
there is no consensus among writers as to whether the grounds for such
a remedy are just an expansion of the doctrine of force majeure or are
instead to be found in a new doctrine. Be that as it may, such grounds
are expounded throughout the civilian world under the French label of
theorie de l'imprvision, or theory of unexpected circumstances.
That theory is certainly not novel. Its roots can be traced to Roman
writers for whom every contract contained rebus sic stantibus-which
can be freely translated as "provided the circumstances remain unchanged"--as an implied term. Thus, in entering a contract the parties

8. See generally, I J. Puig Brutau, Fundamentos de derecho civil - Doctrina general
del contrato 363-73 (1954).
9. La. Civ. Code, Bk. 111,Tit. 111,Ch. 6, Sec. 2, arts. 1873-1878 (as amended and
reenacted by 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § 1).
10. Thus, La. Civ. Code art. 1876 provides: "When the entire performance owed by
one party has become impossible because of a fortuitous event, the contract is dissolved.
The other party may then recover any performance he has already rendered." That is so
because the impossibility of one party's performance determines the failure of the cause
of the obligation of the other party, thereby prompting the dissolution of the contract;
see I S. Litvinoff, Obligations 399, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969).
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bound themselves to perform, provided the circumstances existing at
that moment remained the same. A change in circumstances was
regarded as an alteration of the contractual foundation which resulted
in the contract either coming to an end or becoming susceptible to
judicial revision, ad aequitatem reduci." It is noteworthy that the words
"rebus sic stantibus" are just the core of a maxim the full text of
which is, Contractus qui habent tractum succesivum et dependentiam
de futurum, rebus sic stantibus intelligentur-which may be freely translated as, "Contracts providing for successive acts of performance over
a future period of time must be understood as subject to the condition
that the circumstances will remain the same."' 2 The full text of the
maxim clearly shows the importance to be given to changes in circumstance when parties enter into contracts of long duration calling for a
series of acts of performance. Contracts of that kind, such as lease or
requirement or output contracts, differ greatly in purpose and structure
from contracts calling for instantaneous, immediate, or simultaneous
performance by the parties, such as the cash sale of a movable thing. 3
That approach was relied upon also by the Romanist school of
glossators, and later by Canonist writers, but started its decline towards
the end of the eighteenth century, owing to the prevalence of the
economic and political theories of capitalism and liberalism. Since then,
and for over a century, rebus sic stantibus has been replaced by pacta
sunt servanda, that is, "contracts must be honored," with the implication
that it must be so regardless of any change in circumstances and re4
gardless of cost, effort, or sacrifice to the obligor.'
Dramatic changes brought about by World War I in the social and
political spheres and the upsetting impact of both World War I and II
upon the world economy, as reflected in recession, depression, and
rampant and destructive inflation, among other consequences, brought
thtorie de l'imprvision back into focus.
Though that theory has many followers, it also has a good number
of opponents. The arguments advanced against the theory can be

11. See 3 J. Bonnecase, Supplement to Baudry-Lacantinerie, Trait6 th6orique et pratique de droit civil 595-96 (1926); A. Bruzin, Essai sur lanotion d'impr6vision et sur son
role en matire contractuelle 87-123'(1922); 1 J. Puig Brutau, supra note 8, at 363-68.
12. This formulation of the maxim was made by the Romanist school of postglossators. Some writers trace the origin of the maxim to Cicero in De Officiis-Of
Duties; others, to Seneca in De Beneficiis-Of Benefits or Gifts. It appears in a passage
by Neratius in the Digest, Book VII, Title 4, Law 8, and also in a passage by Marcellus,
also in the Digest. See L. Rezz6nico, La fuerza obligatoria del contrato y lateoria de
laimprevisi6n 21 (2d ed. 1954).
13. La. Civ. Code arts. 1776, 1975, 2019, and 2024, introduced by the revision of
the law of obligations enacted in 1984, now contain rules that expressly contemplate
contracts of long or unspecified duration.
14. See G. Borda, La reforma de 1968 al codigo civil 249-50 (1971); Sharp, Pacta
Sunt Servada, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 783, 792 (1941).
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summarized in a few points. First, a contract is, primarily, an instrument
of prevision, or foresight. A party who enters a contract of long duration
or a contract to be performed through a long series of successive
performances, intends, precisely, to protect himself against changing
circumstances, an intention that is defeated by a theory allowing relief
to an obligor if such changes place him in a harsh situation. Secondly,
contracts are made to be fulfilled. A theory that allows departure from
such a basic principle introduces an element of insecurity and instability
in the legal relations of the parties to a contract. Thirdly, strict performance of contracts is material not only for the law but also for
morals, since respect for the pledged word is a matter of honor. Fourthly,
thorie de l'inprvision allows the courts a discretion as excessive as it
is dangerous, since that theory opens the door to increasing intervention
by the state, thereby resulting in progressive reduction of the autonomy
of the will of private parties. 5
Such objections, though consistent with a liberal philosophy of law,
exhibit a rigidity incompatible with basic ideas that shape the spirit of
modern law.' 6 It is one thing to expound respect for binding agreements,
a principle whose merits are beyond dispute, and quite another to turn
contracts into instruments of oppressive unfairness. No doubt, a contract
is an admirable instrument for exercising foresight, and it is not denied
that parties do quite often enter a contract for the purpose of sheltering
themselves against the risk involved in changing circumstances. Provided
the operation of those principles is kept within reasonable limitations,
the obligations arising out of contract must indeed be honored, even
though performance becomes more burdensome than anticipated by one
or all parties at the moment of contracting. Nevertheless, when the
change in circumstances is reasonably unforeseen and is such that the
obligor can perform only at the cost of an excessive sacrifice, then the
letter of a contract cannot be upheld without substantial alteration of
its spirit, which is the true intent of the parties. That is so because the
intent of the parties is to make a contract that, even if more advantageous
to one of them, is equitable in terms for both. That underlying equity
is destroyed by the assertion that strict compliance with the contract
must obtain always.' 7 It is not denied that performance in compliance
with a contract is a matter that also affects morals, but that moral
principle can be applied only to whatever is foreseeable. Something that
the parties could not have foreseen cannot be comprised by the duty
to fulfill a contractual promise. Lastly, judicial intervention as a means
to achieve greater equity and more fairness in the legal relations of
private parties, rather than being feared, must be welcomed as one of

15.
16.
17.

See G. Ripert, La r~gle morale dans les obligations civiles 152-66 (4th ed. 1949).
See 4 J. Carbonnier, Droit Civil-Les Obligations 260-61 (11th ed. 1982).
id.
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the most significant accomplishments of modern law, enhancing the
importance of substance over form.' 8
At common law, the problems arising from the interference of
unexpected circumstances are dealt with by the doctrines of "frustration
of contract," or "frustration of purpose," and the doctrine of "impracticability." The following discussion will show that such doctrines,
and the thiorie de l'impr'vision as well, are actually founded on that
fatal kind of contract-disease known at civil law as "failure of cause."
Indeed, because of caution or fear of far-reaching implication, a court
may choose to disregard frustration, impracticability, or imprbvision,
but even so, a court simply cannot disregard failure of cause when it
is clearly shown.
Impracticability of Performance
As grounds for granting relief to an obligor, impracticability of the
performance is a doctrine that received its first legislative formulation
in Article 2, Section 615 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Because of
the place where this article is inserted and because of the general provisions set forth in Article 1 of the same code, the operation of that
doctrine was confined to contracts for the sale of goods. That limitation
has been eliminated, however, in the final draft of the Restatement of
Contracts, Second, published by the American Law Institute in 1981.
The Restatement Second incorporates the doctrine of impracticability of
performance without limiting it to a particular kind of contract and
gives the doctrine a formulation more concise than the one in the
Uniform Commercial Code. Thus, according to Section 261 of the
Restatement Second, "Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of
an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which
the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged,
unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary."
Under this doctrine, even though a party, in assuming a duty, has
not qualified the language of his undertaking, a court may relieve him
of that duty if performance has unexpectedly become impracticable as
a result of a supervening event. Like the Uniform Commercial Code,
the Restatement Second states a principle broadly applicable to all types
of impracticability and deliberately refrains from any attempt at an
exhaustive expression of contingencies. '9
The determination of whether the non-occurrence of a particular
event was or was not a basic assumption of the parties involves a
judgment as to which party assumed the risk of such occurrence. For

18. See G. Borda, supra note 14, at 250-51 (1971).
19. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 comment a (1981). See also E.
Farnsworth, Contracts 677-79 (1982).
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example, in contracting for the manufacture and delivery of goods at
a price fixed in the contract, the seller assumes the risk of increased
costs within the normal range. Nevertheless, if a disaster, or a general
crisis, causes an abrupt and extraordinary increase in the cost to the
seller, a court might determine the seller did not assume that risk, by
concluding that the non-occurrence of a general crisis or disaster was
a "basic assumption" on which the contract was made. To make such
a determination, a court will look at all circumstances, including the
terms of the contract. A finding that the event was unforeseeable carries
much weight in suggesting that its non-occurrence was indeed a basic
assumption. Nevertheless, the fact that it was foreseeable, or even foreseen, does not, of itself, suggest a contrary conclusion, since the parties
may not have thought it a sufficiently important risk to have made it
a subject of their bargaining. Another circumstance to be looked into
by the court is the effectiveness of the market in spreading such risks.
For example, if the obligor is a middleman, he has an opportunity to
adjust his prices to cover certain risks. If the obligor is a producer of
2
goods, he may not have such an opportunity. 1
The rationale of section 261 in the Restatement of Contracts, Second
is that the obligor is relieved of his duty because the contract, having
been made on a different "basic assumption," is regarded as not covering
the factual situation that has arisen. It is a risk omitted from the parties'
assumptions that falls within a "gap" in the contract. 2' Ordinarily, the
just way to deal with the omitted or uncontemplated situation is to hold
that the obligor's duty is discharged in the case of changed circumstances
and thus to shift the risk to the obligee.
By appropriate contractual language a party may, nevertheless, agree
to perform in spite of impracticability that would otherwise justify his
nonperformance. In the absence of an express agreement, a court may,
of course, decide that a party assumed a greater obligation. For such
a purpose the court will, again, look at the circumstances. Thus, the
fact that a supplier has not taken advantage of the opportunity to shift
the risk of a shortage in supply to the other party at the time the
contract was negotiated will be regarded as being more significant when
the supplier is a middleman with a variety of sources of supply and an
opportunity to spread the risk among many customers, than when the
obligor is a producer with a limited source of supply and no comparable
opportunity.
If the supervening event was not reasonably foreseeable when the
contract was made, the party claiming discharge can hardly be expected
to have stipulated against its occurrence. If it was reasonably foreseeable,
or even foreseen, the opposite conclusion does not necessarily follow.

20.
21.

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 introductory note, at 311 (1981).
Id. See also E. Farnsworth, supra note 19, at 686-87.
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A court may consider that the practical difficulty of reaching agreement
on the endless number of conceivable terms in a complex contract may
excuse a failure to deal with contingencies that, from the negotiating
table, seem at least improbable.
As expressed in the transcribed Restatement section, the doctrine of
impracticability is sometimes phrased in terms of "impossibility." Nevertheless, as it is unquestionably recognized, the doctrine of impracticability
operates to discharge a party's duty even though the event has not made
performance absolutely impossible. In the mind of the drafters, "This
Section, therefore, uses 'impracticable', the term employed by Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-615(a), to describe the required extent of the
impediment to performance. Performance may be impracticable because
extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss to one of
the parties will be involved. A severe shortage of raw materials or of
supplies due tO war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown
of major sources of supply, or the like, which either causes a marked
increase in cost or prevents performance altogether may bring the case
within the rule stated in this Section. . . . However, 'impracticability'
means more than 'impracticality.' A mere change in the degree of
difficulty or, expense due to such causes as increased wages, prices of
raw materials, or costs of construction, unless well beyond the normal
range, does not amount to impracticability since it is this sort of risk
that a fixed-price contract is intended to cover." 22
It is noteworthy that the new Restatement takes a step beyond the
prior conceptual boundaries of that doctrine and not only contemplates
impracticability that results from supervening events, but also addresses
itself to impracticability "existing" at the moment of contracting. Thus,
section 266 provides in its first paragraph, "Where, at the time a contract
is made, a party's performance under it is impracticable without his
fault because of a fact of which he has no reason to know and the
non-existence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is
made, no duty to render that performance arises, unless the language
or circumstances indicate the contrary."
As stated by the drafters, situations that would fall under the doctrine
of existing impracticability are also susceptible to being adjudged through
application of the rules of mistake. The party entitled to relief in such
a case may, of course, choose the grounds on which to rely. 3
It is noteworthy that one of the illustrations offered by the drafters
is the case of a party who has contracted to sell a particular machine
though, unbeknownst to him, the machine had been destroyed by fire
without any fault on his part. That illustration strikingly resembles the
situation contemplated in article 2455 of the Louisiana Civil Code, "If,

22. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 comment d, at 316 (1981) (emphasis
added).
23. Id. § 266 comment a, at 339.
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at the moment of the sale, the thing sold is totally destroyed, the sale
is null; if there is only a part of the thing destroyed, the purchaser has
the choice, either to abandon the sale, or to retain the preserved part,
by having the price thereof determined by appraisement."
The wisdom of the doctrine of impracticability of performance has
been praised in many scholarly articles. 24 American courts, however,
have been less than enthusiastic in their reception of that doctrine and,
for practical purposes, have concluded that relief on grounds of impracticability will be granted only in situations that meet the strict
requirements for impossibility.2" That reluctance of the courts can be
taken to mean that the future of the doctrine of impracticability is not
very bright.2 Nevertheless, there was an important step toward change
in the decision rendered in Aluminum Company of America v. Essex
Group, Inc.2' Although, so far, that decision cannot be said to have
started a new trend, its persuasive force may very well be discovered
in a time to come. 8
Frustrationof Contract; Frustration of Purpose
Upon its triumph over rebus sic stantibus, pacta sunt servanda
became such a strong principle that, at least in the common law legal
world, courts were prepared to consider the obligations created by a
contract as still standing despite the fact that their performance was
physically impossible. It is clear that such a perception of a contract is

24. See Duesenberg, Contract Impracticability: Courts Begin to Shape § 2-615, 32
Bus. L.J. 1089 (1977); Schmitt & Wollschlager, Commercial Impracticability: Making the
Impracticable Practicable, 81 Com. L.J. 9 (1976); Sommer, Commercial ImpracticabilityAn Overview, 13 Duq. L. Rev. 521 (1975); Squilante & Congalton, Force Majeure, 80
Com. L.J. 4 (1975); Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract
Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. Legal Stud. 83 (1977).
25. See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977); Eastern Airlines,
Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
26. See Hawkland, supra note 7; Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of
Contracts: Judicial Frustration of the U.C.C. Attempt to Liberalize the Law of Commercial
Impracticability, 5 Corp. L. Rev. 195 (1982).
27. 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ALCOA].
28. For favorable receptions of ALCOA and the concept of reformation on the
grounds of impracticability of performance, see Friedco of Wilmington v. Farmers Bank,
529 F. Supp. 822 (D. Del. 1981); McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E. 2d 765, 770 (W. Va.
1984), (Harshbarger, J., concurring). But see Hass v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 495 F. Supp.
815 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc.,
517 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. La. 1981); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981). These decisions reflect an inclination to limit
ALCOA to its particular facts. See also Wabash, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 995
(N.D. 111.
1981); Printing Indus. Ass'n v. International Printing & Graphic Communications
Union, 584 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ohio 1984). These decisions openly criticize the ALCOA
decision.
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too narrow and, since the decision in Taylor v. Caldwell,29 with varying
results, English courts began recognizing the need to broaden that perception for the sake of fairness.
As defined by Lord Radcliffe in Davis ContractorsLtd. v. Fareham
Urban District Council," "frustration occurs whenever the law recognizes
that without default of either party, a contractual obligation has become
incapable of being performed because the circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically different from
that which was undertaken by the contract." The idea is that when a
performance is still physically possible but, because of changed circumstances, it becomes dramatically more burdensome, the rendering of that
performance is no longer a discharge of the obligation originally contracted but rather the discharge of a different one. The language in
some decisions strongly suggests that a change in circumstances may
turn a performance into a "commercially different one which would
suffice to make it fundamentally different."'" In spite of the broad
formulation given to the doctrine, the same English judge, whose definition in Davis Contractors is transcribed above, added that, "Frustration is not lightly to be reached as the dissolvent of a contract." 32
In one view, that is so because the majority of contracts in connection
with which important problems of frustration will arise are made between
businessmen who constantly deal with one another and who may well
be more concerned with maintaining their amicable relations than in
abiding by the strict rules of law. 3 For that reason, it is said, the
majority of such cases are settled peacefully and in accordance with
business practice or by private arbitration, and it is only the exceptional
case which comes before the courts.
Frustration of contract thus concerns the effect that supervening
circumstances, unforeseen at the time of contracting, have upon rights
and duties arising from a contractual arrangement. Frustration arises
when unforeseen events, occurring after the time of contracting, render
performance either legally or physically impossible, excessively difficult,
impracticable, expensive, or when they destroy the known utility which
the stipulated performance had to either party. In the latter instance,
that is, when unforeseen events do not so much make the performance
impossible as they make it impossible for the parties to acquire or enjoy
the advantage for whose acquisition or enjoyment they entered the
contract, the expression "frustration of contract" becomes synonymous

29.
30.

3 B. & S. 826 (1863).
1956 A.C. 696.

31. See Albert B. Goan & Co. v. Soci&t6 Interprofessionelle des Oleagineux Fluides
Alimentaires, 2 Q.B. 318 (1960).

32.

1956 A.C. at 727.

33.

See Aubrey, Frustration Reconsidered-Some Comparative Aspects, 12 Int'l &

Comp. L.Q. 1165, 1169 (1963).
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with "frustration of purpose." Though it has been stated that frustration
of purpose can be present only if the purpose of both parties, or the
common purpose, is destroyed, in most, if not all situations in which
frustration of purpose has been found, clearly the purpose of only one
party to the contract was frustrated. Thus, if war prevents a seller from
delivering machinery for which the buyer paid the price in advance, it
is clear that frustration of the contractual purpose visits only the buyer. 4
It is noteworthy that, in the United States, a distinction has been
made between frustration of performance and frustration of purpose.
The former involves situations where performance has become either
impossible or excessively difficult or expensive, while the latter involves
situations where the known purpose for which either party entered into
the contract has been destroyed."
Through that distinction it is then possible to speak of frustration
as a contractual pitfall not identical with impossibility. Indeed, frustration of one party's purpose is hardly ever caused by the impossibility
of his own performance, but his purpose may very well be frustrated
by the impossibility of the other party's performance. Further, a party's
purpose is frustrated when the other party's performance, though technically and physically possible, has become either totally worthless or
of insignificant value owing to a collateral event that could not be
foreseen at the time of the contract. A question might be raised as to
whether there is true frustration of a party's purpose because of collateral
events when the agreed-upon equivalent promised him in return for his
performance can be given to him, or has perhaps been already given.
It can be said that in such a case the party gets that for which he
bargained, his immediate object of desire. To that question it has been
said, "The answer to this is that a contractor has indirect and ultimate
objects of desire; he bargains for the immediate object in order to attain
more remote ends and in the confident belief that the attainment of
the first will bring home the second one also. Thus a lessee promises
to pay rent in order to induce the lessor to convey a limited estate in
the land-the leasehold interest. He desires to be owner of this leasehold,
with the manifold legal relations of which it is composed, in order to
enjoy the physical use and occupation and to realize the profits therefrom
by operating it as a farm, a dwelling place, a movie theater, or a liquor
saloon. The conveyance is made; and the lessee is in possession and
owner of the leasehold interest. He has attained his immediate object.
Yet he may be wholly ousted from possession by an invading army;
the dwelling house may be burned down; a city ordinance may forbid
the use of inflammable films; the legislature may prohibit the sale of

34. See Fibrosa Spolka Alcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd., 1942
A.C. 32. Cf. Hirji Muiji v. Cheong Yue S.S. Co., 1926 A.C. 497.
35. See The Claveresk, 264 F. 276 (2d Cir. 1920); Patterson, Constructive Conditions
in Contracts, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 943 (1942).
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ultimate purpose of the lessee is frustrated.
as his chief purpose; without it, he would
rent or, at least, so much rent. In a great
of frustration has caused the lessee to refuse

. One who asserts frustration of purpose as a discharge

from duty is seldom, if ever, asserting impossibility of performance of
his own promise as a defense. The principal performance promised by
the lessee, in the cases stated above, is the payment of rent. Nothing
has made that performance impossible. In setting up frustration of
purpose, he is asserting a different sort of defense. Some kind of
contemplated performance may hav6 become impossible; but it is not
'3 6
that promised performance from which he asks to be excused."
Where a balcony was leased for the convenience of watching a
coronation parade but the ceremonies were called off because of the
illness of the king who was to be crowned, a question was raised as
to the effect of the king's illness upon the contract for the balcony.
One answer is, "That it should have no effect whatever unless the
holding of the ceremonies as planned formed what is sometimes called
the 'basis of the contract,' but is more accurately described as the basis
on which one of the parties assented to the bargain. It is not such a
'basis' unless it creates a major part-an essential part-of the value
of one of the performances that the parties agree to exchange, inducing
one of the parties and enabling the other to reach the agreement.""
The similarity, or practical identity, between the views expressed in the
emphasized language, and in the preceding quotation as well, and the
basic ideas that constitute the civil law theory of cause is simply striking.
In a recent case, owing to a change in circumstances consisting of
a cost increase beyond foreseeable limitations, a seller and processor of
aluminum under a long-term contract was reduced to obtaining an
exceedingly low compensation for its deliveries to the buyer and, as a
result, it sought reformation, or adjustment on an equitable basis, of
the contract. The court stated that the main question was whether earning
money, or making a profit, is the kind of purpose that is subject to
frustration so as to allow the granting of relief. The court conceded
that most traditional illustrations of the problem of frustration, such
as those offered in the Restatement of Contracts, seem to involve a
purpose other than making a profit. Nevertheless, with citation of eminent authority and scattered precedent, the court concluded that earning
money is an ultimate end in commercial life and it therefore constitutes
the kind of purpose which is severely disappointed or frustrated when
an unforeseen change of circumstances converts expected profit into a
serious loss."

36.
37.
38.

6 A. Corbin on Contracts 457-58 (1962) (emphasis added).
Id. at 465 (emphasis added).
See ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 76-78.
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In the United States, the latest Restatement of Contracts, in section
265, reformulates the doctrine of frustration thusly, "Where, after a
contract is made, a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his
remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary." In a comment, however, it is clearly stated that the section deals with the problem that
arises when a change in circumstances makes one party's performance
virtually worthless to the other party, thereby frustrating his purpose
in making the contract, and is therefore distinct from the problem of
impracticability, because there is no impediment to performance by either
party.
Though the decision in the Aluminum Company of America case
may herald a change towards a more reasonable approach, the fact is
that, heretofore, American courts have shown considerable diffidence
vis-A-vis allegations of frustration of contract or frustration of purpose. 9
II.

FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE AT CIVIL LAW: FAILURE OF CAUSE

A. Failure of Cause in French Civil Law
Force Majeure; Impossibility of Performance
Under articles 1147 and 1148 of the Code Napoleon, an obligor
who fails to perform is liable for damages unless his performance has
been prevented by an "event not reasonably foreseeable by the parties
at the time the contract was entered into." As expounded by traditional
doctrine and applied by cautious jurisprudence, under the Code Civil
notion of force majeure, for a contract to be discharged, performance
must be rendered absolutely impossible, not merely more onerous. Impossibility may be physical, as in the case of an act of God or loss of
the contractual object without the obligor's fault, or it may be legal,
as in the case of a fait du prince-act of the prince-that, for instance,
40
prohibits exportation of the goods constituting the contractual object.
At first blush, the French notion of force majeure appears as being
narrower than the different common law renditions of impossibility.
That, however, is not so.
Force Majeure and Failure of Cause
While never arriving at a broader formulation of the principle,
French courts have managed to temper the originally stringent approach

39. See Corbin, Frustration of Contract in the United States of America, 29 J. Comp.
Legis. & Int'l L. 1 (1947); Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at
Consolidation, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 287 (1958).
40. See generally, 2 H. Mazeaud, supra note 3, at 593-97.
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to impossibility. Thus, in one case, the contract was discharged because
the physical incapacity of one of the parties prevented his personal
performance although the contract did not require that party to perform
in person, that is, performance was not rendered absolutely impossible
by the fortuitous event that befell the obligor.' In another case, the
contract was discharged because rendering the performance would have
endangered the life of the obligor, even though such performance was
42
not absolutely impossible.
In other cases, French courts have placed themselves in a position
quite similar to that of those common law courts which have taken a
flexible approach to frustration. Thus, in still another case, a tract of
land had been leased for hunting purposes, but the authorities forbade
hunting in that area. The court held that the lessee was entitled to a
reduction of the rent. It is clear in such a case that the prohibition did
not make impossible the performance of the contract of lease, since it
interfered neither with occupation of the leased premises nor with payment of the rent, but rather destroyed the expectation of one of the
parties. 4 3 The French court adopted a liberal view quite similar to, if
not identical with, that of the English courts which decided the coronation cases; such view being that the disappearance of the common
end of the parties puts an end to the contract.
A French court reached an even more interesting conclusion. Plaintiff
was a tailor who, under a long-term contract, had been employed for
the purpose of making fine clothes for defendant's establishment. World
War I, however, caused a dispersion of most of defendant's customers
thereby making plaintiff's services superfluous. Though it is clear that
performance was still physically and legally possible under the traditional
approach, the tribunal de commerce declared the contract dissolved. It
is clear that the underlying reason for the court's reaction was the fact
that unpredictable circumstances prevented the4 parties from attaining the
4
purpose for which the contract was entered.
Decisions of that kind may surprise no one. Indeed, in French
doctrine, force majeure is referred to, and explained under, the theory
of cause. In the civilian tradition no "consideration" is needed to make
a promise enforceable, but a cause must be found at the root of every
obligation in order to make it binding. That cause is the motive, or
end, or reason, or purpose for which a party binds himself. If that
cause fails, the obligation fails also. 45 From that vantage point, force
majeure prevents parties from attaining realization of the end for which

41. Bertrand v. Junot, 1905 Gaz. Trib. 11 2 (Trib. Seine 1905).
42. Letellier v. Carvalho, 1869 D. Jur. IV 211 (Trib. Seine 1869).
43. Aguado v. DeBearn, 1875 D. Jur. 11 204 (Ct. App. Paris 1875).
44. Esteve v. Dubois, 1916 D. 112 (Ct. App. Toulouse 1915).
45. See H. Capitant, De la cause des obligations 23, 25, 275 (1923); 1 S. Litvinoff,
supra note 10, at 435-40.
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they entered the contract. Connection between cause and force majeure
is, thus, direct. Such a direct connection amply justifies a broadening
of the basis of force majeure, especially in view of the fact that a strict
approach to impossibility is the result of interpretation rather than a
clearly formulated rule."
Thorie de l'Imprvision
In Compagnie Gindrale d'Eclairage de Bordeaux v. Ville de Bordeaux,47 plaintiff, a supplier of gas, had contracted for deliveries to the
city of Bordeaux at fixed rates over a period of years. The great increase
in the price of coal, owing to the outbreak of World War I, prompted
the company to demand an increase in the contractual rate, but that
demand was rejected by the departmental authorities. On appeal to the
Conseil d'Etat, the highest French court for administrative matters, the
decision was reversed. The Conseil recognized that, as a matter of
principle, it was in the nature of such fixed-rate contracts that fluctuation
in costs should be anticipated, but said that, as the increased cost
"certainly exceeds the outer limits of the increases that could have been
contemplated by the parties when the contract of concession was concluded," the case should be remanded to adjust the terms of the contract
if the parties could not agree between themselves.
The thorie de l'impr'vision-theory of unexpected circumstancesthus received judicial sanction. At its roots lies a combination of the
overriding principle of good faith, as expressed in article 1134 of the
Code Napoleon, and the reading of a sort of implicit condition rebus
4
sic stantibus into the contract. 1
The theory of unexpected circumstances, however, cannot be regarded as a creation of the Conseil d'tat. The impact of an abrupt
change of circumstances upon contracts of long duration preoccupied
very early civilian writers such as Andr6 Alciat, who propounded a
solution quite similar to th'orie de l'imprvision. French doctrine deems
the fact unfortunate that those writers whose work furnished the guidelines for the redactors of the Code Napoleon, such as Domat and Pothier,
did not give special treatment to such a problem, even though their
work did not expressly bar a comparable solution. 49

46. See David, Frustration of Contract in French Law, 28 J. Comp. Legis. & Int'l
L. 11,12 (1946); R. David, English Law and French Law: A Comparison in Substance
119-23 (1980).
47. Compagnie g~n6rale d'6clairage de Bordeaux v. Ville de Bordeaux, 1916 D. Jur.
I1 25, 1916 S. Jur. I1117 (Conseil d'ttat 1916).
48. See Aubrey, supra note 33, at 1175; 3 J. Bonnecase, supra note 11,at 575-76;
6 R. Demogue, supra note 2, at 689-92.
49. See 3 J. Bonnecase, supra note 11,at 594; A. Bruzin, supra note 11,at 87-123.
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Imprevision was applied many other times by the Conseil d'Etats
In all cases the contract involved is one governed by public law, such
as a contract of concession entered into between a public entity and a
private company for services of a public nature to be rendered by the
latter, that is, a contract strictly governed by administrative law under
the French system." Under imprvision, the party whose performance
became exceedingly more onerous because of unforeseen circumstances
is awarded compensation-indemnite-aimed at restoring the altered
equilibrium of the contract. 2 Confronted with adverse circumstances
that increase its contractual burden the party bound to perform must
nevertheless render performance and then seek compensation. 3 The right
to redress under impr'vision is forfeited if a party fails to perform when
an unforeseen change of circumstances increases the burden of performing.5 To award compensation under inprevision, the administrative
court actually effects a revision of the contract.55 As of late, decisions
of that kind are rare because, in the first place, an enactment of 1974
specifically regulates the indemnity owed a party to a public contract
in case its performance becomes more onerous due to unexpected circumstances. 6 In the second place, conventional imprbvision clauses are
now de rigueur in contracts of that kind.57
For contracts not involving a public entity, or a public service, that
is, for contracts governed by the civil law proper, rather than by administrative law, the highest French civil and commercial tribunal, the
Cour de cassation, has refused application of imprvision and remained
faithful to a strict notion of impossibility. That attitude of the Cour
de cassation has been strongly supported by some French writers. 8 Others
contend, instead, that the scope of imprvision and contract revision

50. See Compagnies r~unies de gaz & d'lectricit6 v. Ville de Basacon, 1927 D. Jur.
Ill 17 (Conseil d'6tat 1925) (note by Closset); Cie des Tramways de Cherbourg, 1933
D. Jur. 111 17 (Conseil d'6tat 1932) (note by Pelloux); Ville d'Elbeauf v. Compagnie
normande de'6clairage, 1950 S. Jur. 111 61 (Conseil d-6tat 1949) (note by Mestre); see
also M. Long, A. Weill & G. Braibant, Les grands arrets de la jurisprudence administratif
(1962).
51. F. Bdnoit, Le droit administratif francais 56-57, 585-95 (1968); J. Dufau, Les
concessions de service public 9-13 (1979).
52. See Ville d'Elbeauf v. Compagnie normande de'6clairage, 1950 S. Jur. 111 61
(Conseil d'tat 1949) (note by Mestre); F. B6noit, supra note 51, at 629. See also M.
Long, supra note 50.
53. See de Laubad6re, Les sanctions de l'inexecution des contrats administratifs en
droit francais, 17 Travaux de l'Association Henri Capitant 257 (1964).
54. See Soci~t6 Prop6trol, 1984 J.C.P. 11 20168 (Conseil d'6tat 1982) (note by Paillet).
55. P. Voirin, de l'impr6vision dans les rapports de droit prive 195-200 (1922).
56. 1974 B.L.D. 362.
57. See David, Frustration of Contract in French Law, 28 J. Comp. Legis. & Int'l
L. 11, 14 (1946); A. Weill & F. Terr6, Droit civil-Les obligations 428-29 (1980).
58. See G. Ripert, supra note 15, at 160-67; Niboyet, La revision des contrats par
le juge, Travaux de la semaine internationale de droit 1-13 (1937).
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should be expanded to make those remedies applicable also to contracts
between private parties since the Code Civil, which does not expressly
contemplate such remedies, certainly does not prohibit them. 9
That split in the jurisprudence of different French courts has led
some commentators to express, in the case of public contracts, that it
is not the unfair situation of the obligor that impr'vision attempts to
remedy, but rather it is the public interest that is so protected, since
such interest, and the community at large, would be greatly affected by
the interruption or discontinuance of a public service.6"
Be that as it may, the close connection between thorie de l'improvision and theory of cause is firmly established in French doctrine.
That is why in many decisions escaping the control of the Cour de
cassation-a tribunal that can address itself only to questions of lawcourts of a lower level, availing themselves of the prerogative that makes
them sovereign evaluators of facts, often conclude that a fact constitutes
force majeure, and therefore determines the impossibility of performance,
even though such impossibility is not absolute but merely amounts to
6
an excessive burden on the obligor. 1
B.

Failure of Cause in German Civil Law
Cause German Style

The German Civil Code does not make express reference to "cause"
as an element necessary to make an obligation binding. That code, thus,
contains no article equivalent to article 1131 of the French or article
1893 of the Louisiana civil codes, which clearly proclaim that an obligation without a cause can have no effect.
Nevertheless, from that silence in the German Civil Code the conclusion should not be derived that the German civilian system has
excluded the notion of cause as an element of contract-formation. Quite
the contrary, all German writers agree that there is no obligation without
a cause.62 Moreover, German law makes a broader use of cause than
does French law. Thus, the doctrine elaborated on the basis of article

59. See P. Voirin, supra note 55, at 195-223. It has been asserted that contract
revision, as a consequence of imprevision, is allowed by article 4 of the Code Napoleon:
"The judge who refuses to render judgment on pretext of silence, obscurity or insufficiency
of the law, may be prosecuted for denial of justice." See P. Voirin, supra note 55, at
204. Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 21: "In all civil matters, where there is no express law, the
judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal
is to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent."
60. See A. Weill & F. Terr6, supra note 57, at 428; 6 R. Demogue, Traite des
obligations en g~nral 688 (1931).
61. See R. David, English Law and French Law: A Comparison in Substance 121
(1980).
62. See I L. Enneccerus & H. Nipperdey, Allgemeiner Teil, Lehrbuch des Burgerlichen
Rechts Pt. II 675-79 (1955).
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1131 of the Code Napoleon has focused its preoccupation upon conventional obligations alone, while in German doctrine the notion of
cause underlies every juridical act susceptible of having patrimonial
consequences, irrespective of whether such an act is so intended. In
must be found, in German law, behind every
other words, a cause
63
declaration of will.
Presupposition or Foundation of Contract
No discussion can be had of cause in German law without a reference
to the doctrine of presupposition-Voraussetzung.Under this doctrine,
just as the parties are free to qualify their transactions by express
conditions, charges, and time limitations, so may the law itself qualify
transactions of private parties by way of implied or constructive conditions or presuppositions. Such conditions may be implied in fact, that
is, ascertained by genuine interpretation of the express terms of a transaction, or implied in law, that is, not really involved in the actual
transaction or found by genuine interpretation, but imposed by law. In
a like manner, the law may qualify transactions with reference to their
that are in accord with the
presuppositions in order to attain results
64
reasonable expectations of the parties.
Circumstances of social intercourse, or business-life, afford full justification to the distinction between condition and presupposition. When
at the time of entering a contract the parties are doubtful as to events
that may affect its terms, they usually introduce a condition. When they
are not doubtful as to future developments, however, unforeseen or not
reasonably foreseeable events may nevertheless thwart the reasonable
purposes on which the contract was framed. In that case, the presupposition-a sort of undeveloped condition-allows a defense based on
the collapse of those reasonable expectations. The presupposition, the
contractual foundation, is like an assumption that the contract would
produce its effect, or operate, under circumstances that, either because
they were reasonably known or because they were supposedly known,
were not made an express condition of the contract.65
Failure of Cause-German Style: The Enhancement
of Good Faith
The connection between "reasonable expectations of the parties"based on presupposition-and the idea of cause, which is always put
in terms of motive, end, or purpose, is inescapable. In fact, it is possible

63. See I S. Litvinoff, supra note 10, at 442-45.
64. See I B. Winscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts 507-19 (Kipp 9th ed. 1963).
65. Id.; I J. Kohler, Lehrbuch des Burgerlichen Rechts 570 (1906); see also R. Pound,
Jurisprudence 499-501 (1959).
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to say that in German law presupposition is identical with cause in other
civilian systems.
It follows then that, in German law, a collapse of the presupposition,
that is, a destruction of the contractual basis, namely, a frustration of
the reasonable expectations of the parties, brings the contract to an end,
exactly as a failure of cause effects the same result under French law.
In one case, thus, a lessor claimed that because circumstances had
drastically changed since the time the contract of lease was entered into,
he could no longer furnish steam for industrial purposes to the lessee,
as the contract provided, and sought to be discharged from that obligation unless the lessee paid a reasonable price for the steam. The court
held that the performance of a contract can no longer be owed or
demanded when, as a result of a complete change in conditions, the
performance has become completely different from the performance
66
originally contemplated and desired by both parties.
A distinguished German scholar explained that decision in light of
what he called the contractual basis or foundation-Geschdftsgrundlageand said, " 'Basis of the transaction,' is an assumption made by one
party that has become obvious to the other during the formation of
the contract and has received his acquiescence, provided that the assumption refers to the existence, or the coming into existence of circumstances forming the basis of the contractual intention. Alternatively,
'contractual basis' is the common assumption on the part of the re'67
spective parties of such circumstances."
Thus, even when the parties have not introduced as an express
condition that certain circumstances must persist in order for the contract
to be effective, dissolution is allowed when the circumstances are altered
in such a manner as to leave the contract without a reasonable basis,
thereby frustrating the parties' expectations. 68
That doctrine was formulated through a flexible interpretation of
the philosophy underlying article 242 of the German Civil Code which
provides, "The obligor is bound to render his performance in the manner
required by good faith with due regard to prevailing usages." ' 69 During
the serious economic crisis that destroyed the value of the German
currency in the aftermath of World War I, that doctrine became the
preferred instrument with which German courts handled the crippling
effects of unprecedented, and therefore unforeseen, changes of
circumstances upon contracts. 0 In that way, the traditional approach to

66. Sp. Co. v. F. Co., 199 RGZ 129 (1920).
67. P. Oertmann, Die Geschaefstgrundlage, ein neuer Rechtsbegriff 37 (1921).
68. See L. Enneccerus & H. Lehmann, Recht der Schuldverhaltnisse 174-84 (1958);
see also 108 RGZ 109 (1924); 106 RGZ 9 (1923); 103 RGZ 329 (1922).
69. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1983 and 2053. See also articles 1901 and 1903 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
70. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: Germany, 63 B.U.L. Rev.
1039, 1046-48 (1983); Cohn, Frustration of Contract in German Law, 28 J. Comp. Legis.
& Int'l L. 15, 16-17 (1946); Smit, supra note 39, at 296-97.
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impossibility of performance yielded to the new concept of financial
impossibility, so that something that appears as impossible to ordinary
business common sense must be considered as impossible in the legal
sense also. 7 That is so not only when the unforeseen circumstances
greatly increase the burden of the obligor, but also when the unforeseen
circumstances, without affecting the material aspects of the obligor's
performance, have turned that performance into something worthless to
the obligee. Thus, performance of the obligation of repaying a loan is
physically, and even legally, possible when the currency in which the
loan was made has lost all its value, but holding that the lender must
be satisfied with such a performance by the borrower violates the elementary and overriding principle of good faith.12 The importance of
good faith was enhanced by German judges even beyond the realm of
contract, in such a way that good faith became a conceptual ground
to explain not only the frustration of contracts, but also the "frustration" of statutes. Thus, in a difficult situation where focus had to be
made on statutes under which worthless currency was still legal tender,
a committee of judges of the Reichsgericht, then the German Supreme
Court, addressed to the government a sort of manifesto expressing that,
"The idea of good faith stands outside any particular statute or provision
of positive law. No legal order that deserves the name can exist without
this fundamental idea. Therefore the legislature may not through its
peremptory order defeat a result that good faith irresistibly commands." 73
Nevertheless, in the case that prompted the doctrine of destruction
of the contractual foundation- Wegfall Der Geschaftsgrundlage-thecourt
was not asked to dissolve the contract but to adjust a particular part
of it. It was argued that if the court had the power to dissolve the
contract it was also empowered, logically, to change one of its terms.
The court accepted that challenge explaining that a full adjustment must
be made so that the loss would not fall exclusively on one party.74
Thus the German stream of the civil law reacted against the notion
that force majeure can be alleged only when unforeseen events made a

71. The foundations for that approach had been established in some German decisions
rendered even before World War I; see Cohn, supra note 70, at 16.
72. See Dawson, The Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany, 1914-1924,
33 Mich. L. Rev. 171, 205-10 (1935).
73. 1924 NJW 90; Dawson, supra note 70, at 1049. See also 107 RGZ 129 (1923).
74. That solution, of course, did not go uncriticized; see Cohn, supra note 70, at
23-25. The revision of contracts by the court received statutory formulation in the Decree
on Judicial Assistance for Contracts-Vertragshilfe Verordnung-in 1939 RGBI 1 2329,
whereby far-reaching powers are granted to district courts for the purpose of amending
certain types of contracts, through a predominantly administrative kind of procedure
adapted to the needs of a noncontentious jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that the controversial
decision rendered in 1951 in the celebrated Volkswagen case, 52 Juristenzeitung 154 (note
by Kegel), has prompted distinguished authorities to express skeptic views on the judicial
revision of contracts; see Dawson, supra note 70, at 1086-98. See also K. Larenz, Geschdftsgrundlage und Vertragserfullung 120-21 (3d ed. 1963).
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performance absolutely impossible. As in other jurisdictions, the traditional, strict approach, arrived at through a literal interpretation of
the provisions of the German Civil Code on impossibility had prevailed
in Germany prior to the advent of the new doctrine.75
Equivalence of Values
Before the consolidation of the doctrine of frustration or collapse
of the contractual basis, German courts achieved comparable results
through a doctrine known as "equivalence of values." That doctrine
asserts that it is of the nature of a reciprocal contract that each party
considers his performance as an equivalent for the counter-performance
of the other. Though there need not be equality of values between the
performances, there must be at least some relationship of adequacy.
When that relationship is destroyed, a performance not reciprocated with
an adequate counter-performance is treated as impossible. 6
The doctrine of equivalence of values was thus a fatal blow to the
traditional view that required absolute impossibility in order to exonerate
an obligor. Indeed, from the vantage point of equivalence, the economic
motives of the parties, the nature and purpose of the transaction, andthe relation of such elements to the change of circumstances began to
matter far more.77
Strikingly enough, the doctrine of equivalence, as a general principle
of fairness that has its source in Pothier, underlies the Louisiana doctrine
of lesion beyond moiety. 6
Coincidence or Ancestry?
The German doctrine of frustration of the contractual basis, the
Anglo-American doctrine of frustration of contract or purpose, and the
American doctrine of impracticability of performance are strikingly similar. The three doctrines address themselves to the consequences of an
event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption of the parties
at the time of contracting. The doctrine of impracticability and that of
frustration Anglo-American style focus on different kinds of
disappointment suffered by a contracting party. Impracticability places
its focus on occurrences that greatly increase the cost, difficulty, or risk

75. See German Civ. Code arts. 275(2) and 306; see also E. Schuster, Principles of
German Civil Law 167 (1907).
76. See 107 RGZ 140; 1920 NJW 961.
77. See Cohn, supra note 70, at 19.
78. See I M. Pothier, A Treatise on the Law of Obligations, or Contracts 21 (W.
Evans trans. 1806). Article 1860 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 expressed that, in
commutative contracts the parties are supposed to give, and receive, equivalents. Though
that article has been eliminated by the revision of the law of obligations enacted in 1984,
the institution of lesion, provided for in former article 1860, has been preserved in La.
Civ. Code arts. 1965 and 2589-2600.
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of the performance owed by one party. The Anglo-American doctrine
of frustration, on the other hand, places its focus on a severe disappointment caused to a party by circumstances that frustrate his principal
purpose for entering the contract. It often applies to relieve a party of
a contract which could be performed without impediment but whose
performance would be of little value to the frustrated party. 79 The
German doctrine covers both kinds of disappointment.80
So striking a similarity warrants the question whether it is just a
coincidence or whether the ancestry of common law frustration and
impracticability can be traced to German law. At first blush, such a
derivation appears strange, since the German doctrine is based on an
equivalent of cause, while the common law never listed cause as an
element of contract-formation. Nevertheless, as clearly put by eminent
common law authority, "A 'contract' never has a purpose or object.
Only the contracting persons have purposes; and the purpose of any
one of these persons is different from the purpose of any other." 8'
Now, if "frustration of contract" is the same as "frustration of
purpose," though not the purpose of the contract itself but the purpose
of one or more parties, then "frustration of purpose," thus understood,
becomes perfectly synonymous with "failure of cause." Indeed, as clearly
explained in article 1967 of the Louisiana Civil Code, cause is the reason
that induces a party to contract an obligation.82
At a second glance, the evolution of modern common law towards
convergence with the civil law where obligations or contracts are concerned is no longer perplexing.83
Concerning the doctrine of commercial impracticability as formulated
in the Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-615(a), its German civil law
overtones may, perhaps, be explained by Karl Llewellyn's familiarity
84
with and fondness for the German version of the civil law.
C.

Failure of Cause in Louisiana Civil Law

Unexpected Circumstances, Contract Dissolution, and
Failure of Cause
The Louisiana Civil Code contains several examples of situations
where a contract may be dissolved because of a sudden change of

79. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 261, 265 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-615(a)
(1978); ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 73.
80. See Smit, supra note 39, at 296-99.
81. 6 A. Corbin on Contracts 455 (1962).
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circumstances. Thus, in the case of loan for use, article 2906 explains
that the borrower must return the thing after expiration of the term
agreed upon, but article 2907 adds, "Nevertheless, if during the interval,
or before the borrower has done with the thing, the lender be in an
urgent and unforeseen need of this thing, the judge may, according to
circumstances, compel the borrower to return it to him." 85
Concerning the contract of deposit, article 2955 provides, "The
deposit must be restored to the depositer as soon as he demands it,
even though the contract may have specified the time for its being
restored .
"..."86
For similar reasons, under article 1705, a testament is revoked by
the subsequent birth of a legitimate child to the testator or by his
adoption of a child. Quite significantly, according to article 953 of the
French Civil Code, even a donation inter vivos is revoked for the same

reason. 87
According to article 2455, if the thing sold is partially destroyed at
the moment of the sale, the purchaser has the choice of either receding
from the contract or taking delivery of what remains of the thing and
having the price thereof determined by appraisement. Louisiana courts
have made that article applicable also to situations where the partial
destruction of the thing occurs after an agreement to purchase has been
made, but before a transfer of ownership has taken place.88
In all those situations the civil code insinuates a foundation for
8 9
thorie de l'imprkvision.
In all of them the common feature is the
frustration of the purpose, or the disappearance of the reason, for which
the transaction was made-the failure of its cause, a failure brought
about by a change in circumstances that frustrates the parties' motives
or expectations.9" Indeed, at civil law, an obligation is closely dependent
upon the existence, the possibility, and the nature of the contemplated
end. Moreover, after its birth, the life of an obligation is subjected to
the materialization of the pursued end because, if the end is not attained,
the binding force of the obligation is not recognized. An obligation is
valid only insofar as the end contemplated by the parties is susceptible
of being attained. 9' A promise has no binding force when it is no longer

85. Emphasis added.
86. Emphasis added.
87. For the legislative history of the Louisiana provision, see 3 Louisiana Legal
Archives Pt. 1 856 (1940).
88. See Daum v. Lehde, 239 La. 607, 119 So. 2d 481 (1960); see also Bornemann
v. Richards, 245 La. 851, 161 So. 2d 741 (1964).
89. See 3 J. Bonnecase, supra note 11, at 477-80, 574-75; Cf. 6 R. Demogue, supra
note 2, at 691-93.
90. See 6 R. Demogue, supra note 2, at 691.
91. See H. Capitant, supra note 45, at 18.
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conducive to the end contemplated by the promisor. As a matter of
necessity, the obligation disappears together with its cause. 92
The close connection between cause and obligation has been recognized by the Louisiana jurisprudence on numerous occasions, though
never with greater clarity than in one case, where the Louisiana Supreme
Court asserted that the realization of the principal cause or motive is
understood to be the basis upon which consent is given and it therefore
becomes a tacit condition of the contract, because the final and principal
motive for assuming an obligation lies in the obvious end being sought. 3
If that cause fails, the will is vitiated and the contract falls. 94 In the
same decision, a dissenting opinion expressed, "Some reliance might
also be placed upon the modern civilian th~orie de I'impr~vision-the
power of the courts to hold negated an obligation when a change of
circumstance or impossibility voids the presuppositions or reasonable
expectations of the parties, although not expressed, which formed an
underlying basis for the agreement." 95
Cas Fortuit and Failure of Cause
The leading Louisiana case involving the connection between fortuitous event, irresistible force, impossibility of performance, and failure
of cause was decided by the United States Supreme Court. 6 In that
case, the lessee of a sugar plantation sought cancellation of the lease
because the plantation was flooded by the Mississippi River and a large
part of the crop and plants were destroyed and the land itself damaged.
It was quite clear, however, that the lease could continue, since it was
not absolutely or physically impossible for either party to perform the
obligations arising under it. With utmost clarity the Supreme Court
addressed itself to two questions. First, whether the overflowing of the
river was truly a fortuitous event, since, because of its recurrence,
flooding could have been foreseen. Secondly, whether a force could be
regarded as irresistible to the effect of releasing an obligor even though
such a force did not make performance absolutely impossible. In both
instances the United States Supreme Court undertook an admirable
exegesis of the Louisiana Civil Code, deeply delving into its direct
ancestor the Code Napoleon and into its more remote ancestor, the
Roman law as reflected in the opinions of Ulpian.
To the first question the Supreme Court answered, "In Louisiana
the breaking of the Mississippi through the levees occurs so often that

92. See I S. Litvinoff, supra note 10, at 396-99. La.
accordingly: "When the entire performance owed by one
because of a fortuitous event, the contract is dissolved ..
93. Cryer v. M & M Mfg. Co., 273 So. 2d 818 (La.
94. Id. at 822.
95. Id. at 830.
96. See Viterbo v. Friedlander, 120 U.S. 707, 7 S.Ct.

Civ. Code art. 1876 provides
party has become impossible
"
1973).

962, 30 L. Ed. 776 (1887).
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it is held not to be an extraordinary accident; but that does not take
it out of the general class of accidents or unforeseen events, cas fortuits.
The breaking of a crevasse in the Louisiana levees by the waters of the
Mississippi River, causing a plantation to be overflowed, must therefore
be considered as a cas fortuit, a fortuitous or unforeseen event ...
entitling the lessee, if the plantation is ...rendered unfit for the purpose
for which it was leased, to have the lease annulled; although it is not
a cas fortuit extraordinaire,an extraordinary as well as an unforeseen
accident . . . ,91
To the second question the Court stated, "In short, the inundation
left the thing leased in such a condition, that it was unfit for the purpose
of a sugar plantation, for which it had been leased, and could not be
made fit for that purpose without spending large sums of money to
restore it to a condition for the cultivation of sugar cane, and to obtain
seed cane elsewhere to start to afresh." 9
On the strength of both answers, reinforced by abundant citations
of French authorities such as Domat, Pothier, and Tropling, the Court
granted cancellation of the lease, since a fortuitous event, though foreseeable, made impossible-perhaps, frustrated?-the purpose for which
plaintiff had entered the contract, even though such an event did not
make performance physically or absolutely impossible.
Albeit the United States Supreme Court used other words in keeping
with the legal terminology prevailing at the time the decision was rendered, transposed into modern terminology the rule of Viterbo v. Friedlander stands for the proposition that the remedy of cancellation must
be granted when the occurrence of an event, the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption of the parties at the time of contracting,
destroys the contractual foundation or purpose for which a party entered
the contract, even though such event does not make the performance
absolutely impossible but renders it only commercially impracticable.
Reference by the Court to the large amount of money necessary to
restore the plantation to a fit condition leaves no room for doubt.
Viterbo v. Friedlander has been often times cited, or distinguished, in
later decisions. 99
Ill.

FORCE MAJEURE

CARE OF

A

AND THE DEGREE OF

PRUDENT ADMINISTRATOR

A. The Standard of Diligence
Degree of Care in the TraditionalApproach to
Force Majeure
The traditional approach to force majeure in both civil law and
common law has developed a very high standard of impossibility of

97. Id.at 733, 7 S. Ct. at 976, 30 L. Ed. at 785.
98. Id. at 736, 7 S. Ct. at 977, 30 L. Ed. at 786 (emphasis added).
99. See Losecco v. Gregory, 108 La. 648, 32 So. 985 (1901).
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performance, according to which an obligor is expected to make all
efforts and employ all his resources in order to overcome whatever
adverse circumstances may interfere with his performance, and he is
relieved only when outside forces, primarily physical, actually prevent
him from performing. That approach, in other words, subjects obligors
to a standard of absolute and perfect diligence.' 0
Contemporary French doctrine criticizes such a rigorous conception
for its disregard of practical needs and social reality. Indeed, it is said,
to demand from an obligor every possible precaution against all foreseeable dangers is unrealistic."" It is beyond dispute that a person who
borrows a thing or who receives it to do some work upon it must keep
that thing safe. Nevertheless, if the thing is stolen or destroyed, it does
not follow that he should be held responsible for the simple reason that
theft or destruction is foreseeable or not insurmountable. For all practical
purposes it can be readily said that everything is foreseeable and, especially because of present-day technology, nothing is impossible. Nevertheless, a party cannot be blamed for not having deposited a borrowed
thing in a vault, or for not having requested special police protection,
merely because a break-in by robbers was possible and therefore foreseeable. He should be blamed only if he took no precautions when he
had good reasons to believe that such a break-in would occur."'12 In
other words, it is not the possible occurrence of an event that makes
it foreseeable, and therefore not susceptible of being regarded as force
majeure, but rather its probable occurrence." 3 In this perspective, the
foreseeability of an event, and thus the effort an obligor is bound to
make in order to prevent its destructive effects, is a matter of the
obligor's prudence, diligence, or degree of care in the performance of
his obligation.
That vantage point casts a different light, not only upon elementary
situations as the one exemplified by the borrower of a thing, but also
upon situations of greater economic and even social importance, as in
the case of contracts of long duration, such as contracts for requirements,
output, or supplies needed by the obligee for the rendering of services
or redistribution to others. Such contracts create between the parties a
relation of interdependence whose equilibrium or imbalance will have
repercussions for other parties and even the community at large. In such
a light, further inquiry is warranted into the truth of the assertion that,
to constitute force majeure, an event must always be unforeseeable and
irresistible in an absolute sense. '°

100. See I H. Mazeaud, Mazeaud & Tunc, Trait6 th~orique et pratique de la responsabilit6 civile d~lictuelle et contractuelle 733-39 (5th ed. 1957).
101. See Tunc, Force Majeure et absence de faute en matiere contractuelle, 43 Revue
trimestrielle de droit civil [R.T.D.C.] 235, 243 (1945).
102. See 2 H. Mazeaud, supra note 3, at 567-70.
103. See 6 R. Demogue, supra note 2, at 576.
104. See McNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U.L. Rev. 854, 902 (1978).
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The Degree of Care of a Prudent Administrator
The Louisiana Civil Code establishes a standard for the diligence
that should be expected, or may be demanded, from an obligor in the
performance of his obligation. Thus, under article 2468, until the moment
of delivery, the obligor who is bound to give a thing is under a duty
to keep it safe, a duty that binds him to take all care that can be
expected from a faithful administrator.'5 The same idea is expressed
also in article 2710 which binds the lessee to enjoy the thing leased as
a good administrator.0 6 That language originates in article 1137 of the
Code Napoleon whose redactors followed Pothier in adopting the model
of a bon p're de famille-a prudent administrator. In Pothier's formulation, what should be expected from an obligor who owes delivery
of a thing to another is "that ordinary diligence which persons of
prudence apply to their own affairs.' ' 0 7 In another work, the eminent
French writer asserted that, in the preservation of the thing sold, the
vendor must exercise common and ordinary diligence and not that of
the most rigorous kind, adding that the vendor incurs no liability if the
thing is destroyed without his fault, conclusions that are incorporated
into articles 2468 and 2470 of the Louisiana Civil Code."" Still in another
work, after setting forth the general contention that a lessee must use
the thing leased as a prudent administrator, Pothier asserts that a lessee
is relieved from his obligation of returning the thing if it has been
destroyed without his fault. These conclusions are incorporated into
articles 1728 and 1733 of the Code Napoleon and articles 2710 and 2723
of the Louisiana Civil Code. 0 9 The same basic idea is reflected in other
articles of the Code Napoleon and the Louisiana Civil Code, such as
article 1882 of the former and 2900 of the latter.
Pothier makes a clear distinction between ordinary diligence and a
more rigorous diligence that implies "all possible care.""10 As a matter

105. Article 1908 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provided, "The obligation of
carefully keeping the thing, whether the object of the contract be solely the utility of
one of the parties, or whether its object be their common utility, subjects the person
who has the thing in his keeping to take all the care of it that could be expected from
a prudent administrator. This obligation is more or less extended with regard to certain
contracts, the effects of which, in this respect, are explained under their respective titles."
That article was eliminated in the revision enacted in 1984, but only as a consequence
of the elimination of the separate regime for obligations to give and obligations to do.
Article 1908 formulated a general principle which is clearly restated in article 2468. On
the other hand, the distinction between "to give," "to do," and "not to do" subsists
as a distinction pertaining to objects of the performance; see La. Civ. Code art. 1756;
art. 1986 comments b and c.
106. See French Civ Code art. 1728.
107. See I M. Pothier, supra note 78, at 82.
108. See 3 Oeuvres de Pothier, Trait6 du contrat de vente 24-26 (Bugnet ed. 1861).
109. See 4 Oeuvres de Pothier, Trait& du contrat de louage 69-74 (Bugnet ed. 1861).
110. See 3 Oeuvres de Pothier, supra note 108, at 24.
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of principle, only the first one, that is, ordinary diligence, should be
expected from 'an obligor, though Pothier says quite clearly that, "The
degree of diligence which the debtor is bound to apply differs according
to the varying nature of the engagements upon which the obligation
depends.""' The travaux pr~paratoiresoffer sufficient elements to support the conclusion that the redactors of the Code Napoleon did not
intend to depart from Pothier's formula in drafting French article 1137,
which is the ancestor of article 1908 of the Lousiana Civil Code of 1870. ' '2
It is significant that post-classical French doctrine has reverted to Pothier's
traditional ideas on the standard of care of a prudent administrator in
its search for a standard of diligence to be applied to the performance
of an obligation. '"
Degree of Care and Force Majeure
There can be little doubt that a prudent administrator-a bon pore
de famille-would not be so foolish as to ruin himself for the purpose
of protecting his possessions against all possible danger or for the purpose
of completing a performance he has engaged himself to render." 4 On
the contrary, consistent views assert that a prudent administrator is a
person of normal or fair diligence. He is expected to exercise, "The
diligence that an individual as diligent as men ordinarily are exercises
in the preservation of his possessions."'' 5 Likewise, a prudent administrator has been described as a person who shows ordinary diligence
in managing his patrimony, a person who exercises current solicitude
in caring for the things in his custody." 6
If the performance of an obligation calls only for the ordinary
diligence of a prudent administrator, and if it suffices for an obligor
to exercise normal care in fulfilling his contractual duty, then it is
inconsistent to assert that only an unforeseeable and irresistible obstacle
will relieve that obligor from liability if he fails to perform.'"' In other
words, because both extreme foresight and unusually strenuous efforts
to resist adversity are beyond an ordinary degree of care, the traditional
approach to force majeure gives rise to a contradiction between articles
2468 and 1873 of the Louisiana Civil Code. The former expresses the

111.See 3 Oeuvres de Pothier, Trait du contrat de nantissement 402 (Bugnet ed.
1861).
112. See Bigot-Preameneu, Expose de motifs, in 12 J. Locr6, La legislation civile,
commerciale et criminelle de ]a France 327, 388 (1828).
113. See especially Tunc, supra note 101, at 249-54; 1 H. Mazeaud, supra note 100,
at 733-39.
114. See I H. Mazeaud, supra note 100, at 735.
115. See R. Troplong, Le droit civil expliqu6 suivant I'ordre du code-De la vente
209 (1836).
116. See 8 C. Beudant, Cours de droit civil fran~ais 289 (1936); see also 1 L. Larombire, Th6orie et pratique des obligations 420 (1885).
117. See Tunc, supra note 101, at 246.
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standard of diligence, the latter contains the doctrine of fortuitous event
or irresistible force as an excuse for nonperformance.
In spite of its place in the civil code, article 2468 is not confined
to the regulation of not yet fulfilled obligations the performance of
which consists of giving a thing. Almost unanimously, French doctrine
asserts that the article in the Code Napoleon that served as inspiration
for the Louisiana article is the carrier of a general principle that establishes the degree of care or diligence expected from an obligor whatever the kind of obligation he must perform." That is, an obligor must
exercise the ordinary care and diligence of a prudent administrator
whether the obligation is to keep safe the thing he must deliver, which
is an obligation to achieve a certain result, or whether the obligation
is to make all reasonable efforts to achieve a certain result.,"
On the other hand, article 1873 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides
in part that an obligor is not liable for his failure to perform when it
is caused by a fortuitous event that makes performance impossible. That
language seems to suggest that an obligor will not be excused unless
performance has been rendered impossible by a fortuitous event. Such
a result, however, appears to be in direct contradiction with the standard
of care established in article 2468. Elimination of the contradiction
between articles 2468 and 1873 calls either for an increase in the standard
of diligence expected from a prudent administrator or for a decrease in
the strictness with which force majeure is conceptualized under the
traditional approach. Since the standard of care of a prudent administrator is well defined, and unquestionably accepted as a duty to exercise
normal or ordinary diligence, the only alternative left is to attempt a
new conception of force majeure under which the required unforeseeability and irresistibility need not be of an absolute character but can
be reduced to reasonable proportions. In this regard, it is noteworthy
that the standard of a prudent administrator has been introduced in the
Louisiana Mineral Code, though qualified in order to enhance its flexibility. Article 122 of that code states that a mineral lessee is bound to
operate the property leased as a reasonably prudent operator.
Degree of Care and Nature of the Obligation
Through his consent, an obligor may assume the obligation to build
a house, or to transport a thing, or to deliver a thing he has sold, or
to supply large quantities of gas over a long period of time. Unless an
obligor is so powerful that his will alone suffices to make things ma-

118. The French Civil Code does not contain an equivalent to La. Civ. Code art.
2468 in its title on sale; see 3 Louisiana Legal Archives Pt. II 1360 (1942).
119. See 2 A. Colin & H. Capitant, Cours 6lmentaire de droit civil francais 87-88
(de la Morandiere 10th ed. 1953); 7 M. Planiol & G. Ripert, Trait& pratique de droit
civil franqais 161-63 (2d ed. 1954); see also Tunc, supra note 101, at 247-49.
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terialize, the performance of his obligation will boil down to his exercising a certain diligence in producing or bringing about the object
of that performance. For that purpose he will make arrangements for
materials, give instructions to his personnel, and take precautions. He
will fight, in other words, against his own inertia, against the inertia
of things, and against the ill will or the unfavorable disposition of other
men.' 2" It can be readily understood that, in such an endeavor, an
obligor may run into unforeseen obstacles, namely, increase in prices,
unavailability of raw materials, threat of expropriation, or unexpected
depletion of supplies. When such obstacles are encountered the obligor's
diligence is challenged by adverse forces. If he overcomes such forces
he will be able to perform and extinguish his obligation by discharge.
If he does not, his failure to perform then gives rise to the problem
of his liability.
Under article 1994 of the Louisiana Civil Code, an obligor may not
be held liable for damages unless he has incurred fault.' 2' That fault,
however, cannot be established without a prior determination of the
kind of diligence that the obligor should have exercised in order to
perform his obligation. 2 Thus, in case of a failure to perform, the
question of the obligor's liability cannot be covered from an inquiry
into the sufficiency, or reasonableness, of the diligence that he exercised
in attempting to perform. Put in other words, the true question is
whether the obligor was under a duty to overcome a particularadverse
23
force.1
The degree of care, or diligence, owed by an obligor depends on
the content and scope of the particular obligation that binds him. A
person who receives in deposit, or borrows, a thing of mediocre value
cannot be placed under the same duty of care as a bank which shelters
a unique and precious thing in its vault. It is clear that an obligor's
duty of care may be heavier or lighter according to the kind of contract
he has made. Thus, under article 2898 the borrower of a thing is bound
to keep it in the best possible order. Under article 2900, if destruction
of the thing borrowed would have been avoided had the borrower used
a thing of his own, he is liable for the loss of the former. According
to article 2937, in preserving the thing deposited with him, a depositary
is bound to use the same diligence that he uses in preserving his own
property. And, with utmost clarity, article 3003 explains that the liability

120. See Tunc, supra note 101, at 237.
121. See La. Civ. Code art. 1994 comments a and b; art. 1873(4); and article 1930
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870; Esmein, Le fondement de la responsabilite contractuelle rapproche de la responsabilite delictuelle, 32 R.T.D.C. 627, 660 (1933). See also
2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations 341-46, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1975).
122. See 4 C. Aubry & C. Rau, Droit Civil Francais 102 (E. Bartin 6th ed. 1942) in
I Civil Law Translations (A. Yiannopoulos ed. & trans. 1965).
123. See Tunc, supra note 101, at 237.
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a mandatary incurs for his fault is less rigorous when his services are
24
gratuitous than when he receives a compensation.1
The Louisiana jurisprudence exhibits an awareness that the degree
of diligence expected from an obligor is a matter that concerns the
content of the obligation which a particular contract imposes upon him.
Thus, where public transportation is involved Louisiana courts have said
that, "It is well established that common carriers are charged with the
highest degree of care to their passengers and that the slightest negligence
causing injury to a passenger will result in liability."' 2 Though very
high, such a standard does not, however, turn a carrier into an insurer
of its passengers, which means that no liability arises unless the carrier
is shown to have been derelict in meeting his heavy duty to exercise
diligence. 2 6 An injured party under a duty to mitigate damages is bound
to take only reasonable steps to minimize the consequences of the injury
and the standard by which those steps are measured is that of a rea27
sonable man under like circumstances.'
Thus, the imposition of a very high degree of diligence still does
not mean that an obligor must defy the impossible in order to perform.
Even when exceptional skill and responsibility are expected from an
obligor, as in the case of one rendering professional services, he must
be exonerated from liability if it is shown that, using his best judgment,
he did all he could under the circumstances, that is, he employed the
degree of skill ordinarily employed under similar circumstances by other
28
renderers of the same kind of services.
Since, as shown, the degree of diligence or care that must be exercised
in the performance of obligations is neither fixed nor immutable, but
instead varies in accordance with the content of each obligation, it is
then inescapable that the test of unforeseeability and irresistibility which
an event must meet in order to be regarded as a force majeure cannot
be maintained with inflexible or indiscriminate rigor. The test of absolute
impossibility cannot be supported as a matter of policy designed to
induce obligors into maintaining high standards of performance. If the
lawmaker's objective is that the highest possible diligence be exercised
always, such an objective would be clearly set forth but, so far, the
lawmaker has not so done. On the contrary, the lawmaker has chosen
the prudent administrator as the preferred standard. Under the articles
of the Louisiana Civil Code discussed earlier, that standard is at odds

124. See also French Civ. Code arts. 1880, 1882, and 1927.
125. Galland v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 377 So. 2d 84, 85 (La. 1979); Wise
v. Prescott, 244 La. 157, 151 So. 2d 356 (1963).
126. See Davis v. Owen, 368 So. 2d 1052, 1055 (La. 1979); Comeaux v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 910 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980), writ denied, 383 So. 2d 782 (La.
1980).
127. See Easterling v. Halter Marine, Inc., 470 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
See also La. Civ. Code art. 2002.
128. See Tunc, supra note 101, at 247.
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with absolute impossibility as a measure for force majeure. In applying
that test of absolute impossibility, courts neglect the prudent administrator as a standard of diligence in an attempt to achieve particular
results through indirect methods. Such attempts lead to undesirable social
results.
At any rate, the desirability of imposing a very high standard of
diligence on every obligor is questionable. It is not denied that an obligor
should not be lulled into carelessness. Yet, to demand from him more
than is demanded from a reasonable man who behaves with normal
diligence amounts to denying the social nature of law and, further, to
asserting that there is legal fault where neither social nor moral fault
can be found.' 2 9
Force Majeure and Fault
Articles 2468 and 2710 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which are
specifications of the principle that establishes the standard of diligence
for the performance of obligations, and article 1873 of the same code,
which exonerates from liability an obligor whose performance is prevented by force majeure, can be reconciled according to the preceding
discussion. All that is needed is to realize that the principles contained
in those articles complement rather than contradict each other. Those
articles relate to the same problems and to the same obligations. That
amounts to saying that the content of the obligation contemplated in
article 2468 and force majeure contemplated in article 1873 are compatible notions. 30 Put in other words, fault on the one hand and force
majeure on the other are alternative bases for decision whenever an
obligor fails to achieve the results the parties expected, for such a failure
can only be explained either by the obligor's default or by the interference
of an event beyond his control and for which he cannot be blamed.
More obviously, he is either chargeable or not chargeable for that
failure. '1'
The event beyond his control that may explain the obligor's failure
is that obstacle which, in spite of the obligor's having exercised all the
care and diligence he owed under the contract, suddenly appeared to
obstruct his performance and is such that it could be avoided or overcome
only by means superior to those at his disposal or superior to those
the contract required him to employ. Such an event is a force majeure
that, in this light, appears as marking the limit or borderline of the
obligation. The expression "force majeure" indicates, by itself, a comparison between the magnitude of the obstacle and the diligence owed,

129. Id.
130. See J. Radouant, Du cas fortuit et de la force majeure 232-43 (1920); Rodiere,
Une notion menac~e: La faute ordinaire dans les contrats, 52 R.T.D.C. 201 (1954).
131. See 2 H. Mazeaud, supra note 3, at 732.
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and clearly means that situation or event which exceeds the scope of
such diligence. 112
Force Majeure and Absence of Fault
If fault and force majeure are alternative notions, then force majeure
becomes the correlative of absence of fault. That is so because if an
obstacle is such as to prevent performance though the obligor exercised
all the diligence he owed in attempting to perform, then he committed
no fault. If he can avail himself of force majeure, it is because of the
absence of fault on his part-both support each other reciprocally.'
That relation between force majeure and absence of fault was clear
to Pothier.' 34 In the words of a later authority, "An appraisement of
force majeure implies a comparison between the seriousness of an obstacle to the performance of an obligation and the energy the obligor
would have to spend to overcome it. If the obstacle appears to be the
greater quantity, vis major, the obligor, if he had done as much as he
could, is relieved from all liability."''
It is not that an obligor should be released from liability only upon
a showing that he was not at fault. In spite of the lack of fault on
his part, the obligor must still prove the nature of the obstacle, force,
or event that prevented his performance. The absence of fault has no
other effect than reducing to reasonable proportions the unforeseeability
and irresistibility of that obstacle. Thus, for example, if during a war
a mechanic endeavors to repair a car in his shop and that shop is
destroyed when the city is bombed by the enemy, his absence of fault
should allow his plea of force majeure even if bombardment was foreseeable because of the war.'- On the other hand, a person who, in the
same city, undertook the custody of a priceless work of art, or a precious
manuscript, or valuable securities should not be allowed such a plea if
he cannot show that he deposited the thing in a bank vault or otherwise
did as much as he could to preserve it.' 37
The Jurisprudence
Though the correlation between force majeure and absence of fault
has gathered strong support in continental doctrine, the jurisprudence

132.
133.
134.

135.
136.
137.
of fault

See 7 T. Huc, Commentaire th~orique et pratique du code civil 202 (1894).
See 3 J. Bonnecase, supra note II, at 553.
See 4 Oeuvres de Pothier, supra note 109, at 73.

7 T. Huc, supra note 132, at 202 (emphasis added).
See I H. Mazeaud, supra note 100, at 568.
It is noteworthy, however, that some writers attempt to distinguish between absence
and force majeure, but rather from an evidentiary point of view; see 6 R.

Demogue, supra note 2, at 580. Other writers, on the contrary, suggests that absence of
fault on the part of an obligor is a finding that may help a court in achieving the same

results as under theorie de I'imprevision; see, e.g., L. Rezz6nico, supra note 12, at 125-51.
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of France and Louisiana, and of the common law world as well, still
adhere to traditional views on unforeseeability and irresistibility and
demand a very high standard of impossibility in order to exonerate an
obligor who invokes force majeure. There are indications, however, of
some change in that trend. Certain French and Louisiana decisions have
granted relief to an obligor who encountered in his performance an
obstacle he could not have overcome with the degree of diligence that,
according to the nature of the contract, could be expected from him.
In one case a Louisiana court said, "Rain is foreseeable, but excessive
rain to the extent of twenty-one inches above normal, with abnormal
frequency (a rain every three days), does not seem reasonably foreseeable,
and in this case, under this contract, falls in the category of fortuitous
event.""' In a case where, because of pronounced fluctuations of the
market-price, a supplier of gas failed to perform a contract for the
delivery of such commodity, the court found that a five-fold increase
in the price of natural gas over a three-year period amounted to a
"drastic rise" neither foreseen nor reasonably foreseeable by the parties
39
at the time the contract was entered.'
Beyond that, French writers place great emphasis on a case where
the Cour de cassation exonerated the defendant from liability on grounds
that its employee had committed no fault, even though the fortuitous
event that caused damage to the plaintiff was foreseeable.''
Decisions of that kind, in sharp contrast with earlier Louisiana cases
characterized by a strict and inflexible approach to force majeure, are
persuasive authority for the reception of a more flexible standard of
impossibility in the jurisprudence of France and Louisiana.
B.

Diligence in Performance of Contracts of Long Duration
Contracts of Long Duration

Modern law is aware of the distinction between contracts giving rise
to obligations that are performed in just one act, whereby the parties

138. Davis v. Tillman, 370 So. 2d 1323, 1325 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
139. See Continental Oil Co. v. Crutcher, 434 F. Supp. 464, 471 (E.D. La. 1977),
where plaintiff-purchaser filed a motion for preliminary injunction in order to compel
specific performance by defendants-sellers of a contract for the supply of natural gas.
But see 465 F. Supp. 118 (E.D. La. 1979), where, upon the parties' joint motion to reopen the proceedings, and because of a joint stipulation entered by the parties, the court
withdrew comments and remarks made in the initial decision that were unnecessary for
the conclusion reached in the second opinion. Preliminary injunction was again denied
though on different grounds. It is clear, however, that the second decision does not reflect
a change of mind of the court concerning a five hundred percent increase in price as
force majeure, as the parties' stipulation allowed the court to dismiss the motion on the
finding of lack of irreparable harm on the part of plaintiff.
140. Molinier v. Soci~td Transports S.V.P., 1956 Gaz. Pal. 11 149 (Cass. civ. Ire 1956)
(note by Blin).
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bind themselves for a short term, and contracts giving rise to continuous
relations between the parties for a long term. In contemporary terminology the expression "transactional ventures" designates contracts of
either instantaneous or short term performance, while the expression
"relational ventures" has been coined to mean contracts entered in order
to govern the parties' relations for a long time.' 4 1 In the former, the
parties are in a position to plan their affairs on the assumption that
known risks may affect performance in a foreseeable manner. 42 In the
latter, the assumption is that preliminary planning may be inadequate
since unknown risks may occur during the long life of the contract, a
reason for which the continuous relation arising from the contract is
not always fully articulated.' 43
44
That distinction is now reflected in the Louisiana Civil Code.
Nevertheless, the traditional law of impossibility, patterned no doubt to
befit the model of transactional ventures, does not account for the
45
realities of relational ventures.'
Contracts contemplating a continuous performance or a series of
acts of performance over a long time are the result of modern business
practices and have been recognized by the law as a useful tool to meet
the practical needs of commerce. Indeed, demands of a complicated
industrial society compel manufacturers and distributors of goods, and
purveyors of services for large markets, to secure a steady supply of
the raw materials or finished goods required by their normal operation,
just as such needs also compel producers of goods to secure steady and
reliable outlets for their output. On the Continent, such contracts are
called contrats de fourniture. Agreements of that nature are of different
kinds, such as contrat de distribution (distribution contract), contrat de
collaboration (cooperation contract), contrat d'integration (integration
contract), and contrat d'assistance et fourniture (requirements and fi46
nancial assistance contract).
Whatever their kind, the distinctive feature of all such contracts is
that they do not provide for a single act of performance but for a
series of acts that will take place, usually, over the course of a long

141. See MacNeil, supra note 104, at 902; see also MacNeil, Economic Analysis of
Contractual Relations, 75 NW. U.L. Rev. 1018, 1027-28 (1981).
142. See Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial Impracticability,
69 Minn. L. Rev. 471, 487 (1985).
143. Id.
144. See supra note 13.
145. See Trakman, supra note 142, at 487.
146. See J. Mousseron & Seube, A propos des contrats d'assistance et fourniture, 1973
Dalloz Chronique [D. Chron.] 197; Seube, Le contrat de fourniture (1970); J. Jobin, Les
contrats de distribution de biens techniques (1972); Savatier, La vente de services, 1971
D. Chron. 223; B. Teyssie, Les groupes de contrats (1971); J. Escarra, Cours de droit
commercial 77 (1952); 2 G. Ripert, Trait6 6lmentaire de droit commercial 379-80 (8th
ed. 1976).
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time. In modern law, requirements contracts, contrats de fourniture,
and contracts of related kinds are conceived of as agreements establishing
general rules, in the form of a private "constitution" of the parties,
designed to govern a series of specific contracts that the parties intend
to enter either thereupon or in the future. Thus, rather than "contracts"
in a traditional sense, they are a framework for future dealings-a
47
contrat-cadre, or framework contract.'
Perhaps the clearest assertion made on the nature of a contrat de
fourniture or contrat-cadre is that it is similar, if not identical, to an
agreement to engage in further good faith negotiations.'48
Good Faith and The Parties' Objectives
There is a general tendency to believe that the main purpose the
parties have in mind when entering a contract of long duration, is to
assure a buyer that he will be able to get the needed supplies at a
certain price, either fixed or subject to variation according to an agreed
scale. Such view is only partial and therefore not realistic. As recently
put from the vantage point of legal and business experience: "The parties
to a long-term contract have other objects in mind than one strictly of
price. Their principal object is, for the seller, a market, and, for the
buyer, a supply of goods. To be sure, price, as an element of concern,
is always present, because the seller must obtain a return of his costs,
and the buyer must pass on his costs, including the purchase price of
what he gets from the seller, to his customers. But for both, price is
more of a means to an end, rather than an end itself. The longer the
term of the contract, the more the principal object of the contracting
parties refers to supply of goods and the manner in which it will be
supplied and the less to the highest or lowest price which can be obtained.
The seller and buyer on a long-term arrangement are not in the same
relationship as there exists between one out of a multitude of sellers
who sells on an ad hoc basis to one of a multitude of buyers of that
particular product with a single or a few deliveries being made shortly
after the date of contracting to fulfill the seller's obligation to deliver.
The buyer and seller in a long-term arrangement are molded into some-

147. See I S. Litvinoff, supra note 10, at 537; J. Mousseron & Seube, supra note
146, at 197. See also Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 823 (1941);
Llewellyn, What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704, 727-37
(1931).
148. See J. Mousseron & Seube, supra note 146, at 199; Carbonnier, Vente, 56
R.T.D.C. 624 (1958).
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thing other than that typically envisaged
by the common law as that
49
existing between buyer and seller.'
In such a context, it is clear that the preservation of the relationship
is a primary interest of the parties and for that reason cannot be ignored;
they must be ready to make and receive concessions from time to time.' 50
Parties to that kind of contract know that a breakdown of confidence
between them may mean more than mere termination of the relationship,
as the cost of entering new contractual arrangements with other parties
may be very high, and a disruption of performance may have devastating
effects for other parties such as producers and suppliers whose business
has become interdependent with that of the parties, consumers, and
more often than not, the community at large.' 5'
The overriding duty of good faith that the parties owe themselves
reciprocally is thus enhanced in contracts of long duration.' 2 The emphasis is displaced from the individual end pursued by each of the
parties to the end pursued in common by all of them, as if the contract
were a joint-venture where the idea of opposed interests yields to the
idea of a certain union of interests among the parties. Thus, insofar as
the expected performance is concerned, the obligee is no longer a creditor
without more. He also becomes an obligor under a duty of collaboration,
an obligation to cooperate in the attainment of the mutual ends, which
need no longer be accomplished solely through the means originally
conceived by the parties but may be achieved by other means supplied
by their will or by judicial fiat.'
The door is thus opened for the
54
modification of contracts.'
Long Duration and Standard of Diligence
The standard of diligence in performance of a contract of long
duration has not yet been explored in depth. The lack of any provision

149. Stroh, supra note 7, at 208-09 (1982). The following reflection is added later on:
"The judicial approach has, on the whole, been not to recognize these differences in the
relationship and the orientation to market/supply rather than price, and, because of the
manner in which the approach of the courts to the problems of impracticability and
frustration is made, the contractor for the longer term has suffered more than the shortterm seller. This is not to say that a seller on the shorter term cannot be subjected to
many of the same burdens on his costs and expectations as the longer term seller. But
where a producer under a short-term contract is caught in a cost/price squeeze, he can
grit his teeth, perform, and raise his price the next time around." Id. at 209.
150. See Trakman, supra note 142, at 490.
151. See C. Havinghurst, The Nature of Private Contract 67 (1961); Trakman, supra
note 142, at 490.
152. See Hillman, Policing Contractual Modifications Under the U.C.C.: Good Faith
and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 Iowa L. Rev. 849 (1979); 2 S. Litvinoff, supra
note 121, at 6.
153. See 2 R. Demogue, Trait& des obligations en g~n~ral 525-44 (1923); 2 A. Colin
& H. Capitant, supra note 119, at 81; 2 S. Litvinoff, supra note 121, at 7.
154. See 6 R. Demogue, supra note 2, at 9, 59-71; 2 S. Litvinoff, supra note 121,
at 6.
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to the contrary warrants the conclusion that, in the Louisiana Civil
Code, the standard of a prudent administrator prevails regardless of the
duration of the contract. Nevertheless, human experience and the regular
course of events show that the longer the period covered by a performance, the greater the likelihood that unforeseen risks will occur.
When properly weighed, this realization supports the conclusion that,
where contracts of long duration are involved, the standard of diligence
to which the obligor is to be held must be lowered at a rate inversely
proportionate to the length of the duration of the contract. One article
of the Louisiana Civil Code lends support to that conclusion. Article
2743, dealing with the contract of lease-a typical example of a contract
of long duration-provides that, "The tenant of a predial estate can
not claim an abatement of the rent, under the plea that, during the
lease, either the whole, or a part of his crop, has been destroyed by
accidents, unless those accidents be of such an extraordinary nature,
that they could not have been foreseen by either of the parties at the
time the contract was made; such as the ravages of war extending over
a country then at peace, and where no person entertained any apprehension of being exposed to invasion or the like . . . . "I A tenant,
thus, is bound to foresee the occurrence of accidents known to happen
in the regular course of events, precisely because such accidents are
foreseeable. He may not be charged, however, with the consequences
of extraordinary accidents, because such accidents are unforeseeable.
Because the lease of a predial estate is a contract of long durationin relative or absolute terms-it is foreseeable that heavy rain, or hail,
or a freeze may occur at least once in the course of several years, but
war, as in the example offered in the article, need not necessarily happen
and is therefore not foreseeable. In other words, the diligence proper
of a prudent administrator does not bind an obligor under a contract
of long duration to foresee extraordinary events. The last paragraph of
article 2743 corroborates that conclusion in asserting that, "The tenant
has no right to an abatement, if it is stipulated in the contract, that
the tenant shall run all the chances of all foreseen and unforeseen
accidents."115 6 The risk of extraordinary events or obstacles must then
be expressly assumed in order to hold an obligor liable for the consequences of such events.
The Louisiana jurisprudence detected long ago that contracts to be
performed through a long series of acts over an extended period of
time require special treatment, primarily from the vantage point of the
overriding obligation of good faith, precisely because a party to such
a contract, unless endowed with a foresight beyond human limitations,
may find himself unwillingly placed at the mercy of the other party.

155.
156.

Emphasis added.
Emphasis added.
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In a case where, in face of rapidly increasing prices, a buyer of coal
under a long-term contract began placing unusually large orders which
the supplier could not fill without sustaining great financial loss, the
Louisiana court clearly understood the unfairness of such a situation
and, perhaps because of an inability to resort to different tools, declared
the contract null for the lack of a reasonable cause, which the court
'57
called a "sufficient consideration.' 1
Also in France, contracts of long duration that call for a series of
acts of performance have elicited a certain reaction from courts. Thus,
the thorie de I'impr'vision, or theory of unexpected circumstances, applies only to contracts providing for successive acts of performance
during a long period and not to contracts that are discharged through
one single act.' 8 In at least one decision the Louisiana Supreme Court
adhered to the view that th~orie de I'imprvision is related to contracts
of long duration. 5 9
IV.

ERROR,

FRUSTRATION,

IMPOSSIBILITY,

CAUSE,

AND THtORIE DE L'IMPRtVISION

Error, Frustrationof Purpose, and Force Majeure
When a party who undertook to deliver large quantities of goods
over a long period of time suddenly realizes that, in spite of rigorous
preliminary calculations, its own source of such goods is insufficient to
satisfy the needs of the contract, while unforeseen and unprecedented
changes in market conditions have made prohibitive the cost of securing
goods from another source, or when a party who undertook to buy
large quantities of goods for industrial purposes suddenly realizes that
unprecedented changes in circumstances have greatly diminished, or destroyed, the market for which the goods were intended, the unexpected
changes partake of the nature of a fortuitous event that is extraordinary.
The question is whether a party in such a predicament can be blamed
for the consequences when, at the time the contract was made, the
general belief of the parties, of the experts who advised them, and even
of public opinion at large, was that future changes would not exceed

certain foreseeable margins.
The compulsion is irresistible to handle such a situation with the
conceptual tools of the doctrine of error which performs the same
function as, though it reaches deeper than, the common law doctrine
of mistake. 61'

157. See Campbell v. Lambert, 36 La. Ann. 35 (1884); see also analysis of the decision
in I S. Litvinoff, supra note 10, at 536-38.
158. See 3 J. Bonnecase, supra note 11,at 578-79.
159. See Armour v. Shongaloo Lodge No. 352, 342 So. 2d 600, 601 (1977).
160. The two words, however, "error" and "mistake," are interchangeable in the
English language. See Hoff, Error in the Formation of Contracts in Louisiana: A Comparative Analysis, 53 Tul. L. Rev. 329 (1979). See also Comment, The Energy Crisis and
Economic Impossibility in Louisiana Fuel Requirements Contracts: A Gameplan for Reform, 49 Tul. L. Rev. 605 (1975).
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As recently expressed, "In broad outline the doctrines of impracticability and of frustration of purpose resemble the doctrine of mistake.
All three doctrines discharge an obligor from his duty to perform a
contract where a failure of a basic assumption of the parties produces
a grave failure of the equivalence of value of the exchange to the parties.
And all three are qualified by the same notions of risk assumption and
authority
allocation." ' '6 ' In a recent work by an influential English
62
mistake and frustration are alluded to as sister-doctrines.1
That reflection of an American court and an English scholar in
light of well-known common law principles is not only compatible with,
but has a stronger foundation in, the Louisiana Civil Code. That is so
because the code expressly relates the doctrine of mistake to the theory
of cause. Thus, according to article 1949 of the Louisiana Civil Code,
which has no equivalent in the Code Napoleon, error invalidates consent
only when it concerns a cause without which the obligation would not
have been incurred. As expressed in the source to which that article
can be traced, the reality of the cause is an essential condition of the
contract, without which the consent would not have been given, because
the will is always determined by a motive and, if there be no such
motive, or cause, where one was supposed to exist, or if it is falsely
represented, there can be no valid consent.' 63 In the same code, impossibility as an excuse for nonperformance, which lies at the foundation
of the related notions of frustration and impracticability, is also strongly
64
connected with cause.
Error of Fact vs. Erroneous Prediction- "The"
Must Concern

Cause that Error

With citation to the Restatement of Contracts, Second, it has been
asserted in a Louisiana case that, to be operative, a mistake must relate
to the facts as they existed at the time of contracting, while a party's
prediction or judgment as to events to occur in the future, even if
erroneous, is not a mistake as defined in the Restatement. 65 Thus, if
parties make a mistake involving the suitability of a certain formula
for the escalation of prices, that "suitability" is a "fact" that existed

161. ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 70 (emphasis added).
162. See P. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 436 (1979).
163. 3 C. Toullier, Le droit civil franais 329 (1833). Article 1824 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870 provides, "The reality of the cause is a kind of precedent condition
to the contract, without which the consent would not have been given, because the motive
being that which determines the will, if there be no such cause where one was supposed
to exist, or if it be falsely represented, there can be no valid consent." See also La. Civ.
Code art. 1949 comment a.
164. See supra text accompanying note 10.
165. Louisiana Power & Light v. Allegheny Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F. Supp.
1319, 1327 (E.D. La. 1981). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 151 comment

a (1981).
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at the time of contracting, while an error on the profit to be made on
the basis of a certain price and escalation formula is an error that
66
involves a future economic event and, as such, is not operative.'
That distinction, which rests on unfirm grounds, is not consistent
with the tradition to which the Louisiana law belongs. Thus, according
to Toullier, whose thoughts have greatly influenced the Louisiana doctrine of error, if the reason that prompts the parties to make a contract
is the occurrence of an event or the existence of a thing, the resulting
obligations will have no cause Jf the event does not occur or the thing
does not exist. 67 A promise to give a sum of money to defray the
expenses of a wedding, for example, is invalid if the wedding does not
take place. 68 By the same token, if an inheritance is sold burdened with
a "rent of land," the obligation to pay such rent is extinguished if the
acquired estate is lost. 169 The inference is thus very clear that, in the
mind of that influential authority, the failure of a basic assumption of
the parties at the time of contracting causes the contract to fail. 7 '
The objection may be raised that situations of that sort actually
involve absence of cause rather than error, but such objection can be
readily dismissed. It has been said in this context that, "It is unquestionable that in Louisiana law, absence of cause, false cause, and error
in the cause have been brought together. Nevertheless, there are circumstances where the lack of a counterpart for the obligation assumed
by one of the parties can be determined on an objective basis. Even
though lack of cause is the result of the party's mistake, this mistake
can be recognized as such in some instances without much inquiring
into the party's state of mind, as when he bought a second insurance
policy for the same risk. Whereas at other times, the mistake cannot
be determined as such without a deep probe into the party's psychological
processes, as in the case of error on a certain quality deemed substantial.
Both situations are the consequence of a mistake . ..."I"
That connection between "absence of cause" and "false cause"
sufficiently explains that "fact" and "prediction" cannot be distinguished for the purpose of finding that an error is operative in the
Louisiana law.

166. Louisiana Power & Light v. Allegheny Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F. Supp.
1319, 1327 (E.D. La. 1981). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 151 comment
a (1981). Cf. ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 70.
167. See 3 C. Toullier, supra note 163, at 329-31, 381.
168. Id. at 330.
169. Id. at 381.
170. See Bilbe, Mistaken Assumptions and Misunderstandings of Contracting PartiesLouisiana Legislation and Jurisprudence, 44 La. L. Rev. 885, 900, 943-44 (1984).
171. S.Litvinoff, "Error" in the Civil Law, in Essays on the Civil Law of Obligations
222, 265-66 (J. Dainow ed. 1969); see also Hoff, supra note 160, at 361-62; J. Ghestin, La
notion d'erreur dans le droit positif actuel 258-60 (1963).
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Both civil law and common law agree that error takes place in the
intellectual representations that precede the parties' declaration of will
that forms that contract.' 72 Since in order to be operative in the civilian
approach an error must affect the cause or principal cause of the
obligation, it becomes imperative to define "cause" in the context of
the doctrine of error, a matter of great concern in French legal literature." 3
In the context of error, "cause" is not reduced to merely the other
party's counterperformance, an approach that brings the civilian "cause"
very close to the common law "consideration."' 74 Quite on the contrary,
for purposes of error, a definition of cause emerges from a deep probe
into the intent of the parties. It has been said in that connection that,
"Cause is the 'juridical reason,' shared by and determining the will of
all parties.'''
It has also been said that cause is the "end," the
"objective," or the intentional element, inherent or implied, in the nature
of the contract, an end that, as a consequence, was known, or should
have been known, to the two parties and therefore not merely personal
to the obligor. 7 6 Always in the same context, it has been asserted that
the will, or consent, cannot be conceived independently of the intellectual
representations that inform it. When such representations are tainted by
error there is lack of accord between representations and the objective
elements that support the will. The essential rapport of "cause-effect"
between the objective elements of the will or consent is thus destroyed
thereby prompting the destruction of the cause.' 77
Where error is concerned the definition of cause reaches deeply into
the social utility of contract. In such connection it has been said that
"cause" is a "necessity" that surpasses mere respect for the parties'
will as it imposes itself upon the parties. "If one admits that a contractual
obligation is not a purely arbitrary creation of the will of the parties
and that a contract, far from being an end in itself, is just an instrument
for the exchange of goods and services, the conclusion is clear that, in
contracts, cause constitutes an independent juridical element of great
importance. It allows knowledge of the end on the basis of which the
parties have contracted. The civil law thereby controls the right utilization
of contract and therefore disallows contracts to be entered without a
78
cause."'

172. See article 1821 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870; Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 151 (1981).
173. See J. Ghestin, supra note 171, at 258-60.
174. See I S. Litvinoff, supra note 10, at 500-02.
175.

176.
177.
178.
(1957).

See I L. Larombi6re, supra note 116, at 295.

See C. Bufnoir, Proprit6 et contrat 529 (2d ed. 1924).
See B. C6lice, L'erreur dans les contrats 116-17 (1922).
2 G. Ripert & F. Boulanger, Trait6 de droit civil d'apres le trait de Planiol 110
See also I R. Demogue, Trait6 des obligations en g~n~ral 540 (1923).
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It is in the context of error that it becomes clear that cause is not
just the other party's counterperformance in a commutative contract.
If cause were only that, as the proponents of the "objective theory"
of cause contend, then it would be a redundant concept whose function
is more efficiently discharged by the concept of contractual object.
Indeed, if acquiring the thing sold were the cause of the vendee's
obligation to pay the price in every contract of sale, the idea of a
itcause" would contribute little or nothing to an analytical approach to
the situation. 79 If the usefulness of the function of cause is to be
rescued, that essential ingredient of an obligation must be explored in
the sphere of the motivation of parties, the reasons that prompt them
to bind themselves. Of course, an error may concern a thing that a
party is buying for no other reason than to have it and enjoy it. In
such a case, the cause on which the error falls can be singled out without
probing too deeply into the party's subjectivity. 0 A deeper probing is
required other times, however, as when the reason for the purchase is
the use of the acquired thing in a subsequent course of action for the
attainment of certain ends. The subjectivity of cause must be, thus,
accepted for the proper utilization of that important requirement as a
useful conceptual tool.' 8 '
Resorting to a terminology which is traditional in the Louisiana law,
the fact that not every motive can be treated as the cause of an obligation
should be explained in terms of communication, or presumption, rather
than alleged objectivity. 82 That motive which is the cause is the one
that has been expressed as such between the parties, or the one that
can be presumed to be the cause under certain circumstances. Parties
are free to make manifest, or to withhold their reasons for binding
themselves through an obligation, their motives to enter into a contract.
If those motives are expressed and the other party is made aware of
them, then according to the almost proverbial expression, they have
entered the contractual field-they become the cause. 83 But if no special
motive is expressed, the law shall presume that the motive is that one
which can be taken as a stimulation of a person's will under the same
circumstances. In other words, if a person is about to purchase something, he may state his requirements in the clearest possible way, thereby
making the vendor aware of what is it that he, the vendee, wants the
thing for. In this manner his motives are communicated to the other

179. See 2 A. Colin & H. Capitant, supra note 119, at 65; 2 M. Planiol, Treatise
on the Civil Law Pt. 1, at 596-97 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959). See also I S.
Litvinoff, supra note 10 at 382, 384-87, 394-96.
180. See S. Litvinoff, supra note 171, at 265.
181. See I S. Litvinoff, supra note 10, at 390-94.
182. See 3 C. Toullier, supra note 163, at 329-30; articles 1824 and 1826 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870; La. Civ. Code art. 1949 and comments.
183. 1 S. Litvinoff, supra note 10, at 395.
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party who now knows that this cause is why the other is going to
obligate himself. However, if the purchaser does not state his concrete
motivation he will be deemed to have been motivated' by a desire to
have the requested thing without more. Thus, the cause of the vendee's
obligation will always be his willingness to have the thing, in every
contract of sale, provided he did not express a more precise motivation.
This means that, confined within these limits, as a general presumption,
the basic tenet of the classical theory of cause still holds, but it is
clearly understood that the presumption can be overcome by proof of
4
special circumstances.1
A motive that is communicated abandons the realm of strict subjectivity. It would be an exaggeration to think that it becomes something
objective. But it should be conceded that, at least, it acquires a certain
inter-subjectivity. This inter-subjectivity is the guideline that allows the
courts to isolate the motive which is the cause, from the other simple
85
motives that cannot be elevated to that category.'
The importance of this inter-subjectivity of the motive that qualifies
as cause can be easily explained. The party who communicates his
motives is asking for a certain cooperation from the other in order to
attain the motivated result. In this manner, the kind or amount of
cooperation requested, or reasonably presumed to have been requested,
also serves as an aid in determining which motive shall be considered
cause. Thus, whichever motive of one of the parties remains outside
the other's ability to cooperate, will not be regarded as a determining
motive; that is, as the cause.' 86
A consumer, for example, normally buys a particular item of merchandise for his personal consumption or that of his family or friends.
It is reasonable to assume that his motive, reason, or cause, for purchasing the item is to obtain it for his personal use or for the use of
his family or friends; that is, for consumption rather than resale. In
such a situation, the seller fulfills his duty of good faith cooperation
by delivering a thing of the required quality that contains no hidden
defect or vice.'87 If, on personal grounds, the purchaser does not derive
the kind of satisfaction or enjoyment he expected from the thing, there
is nothing the seller could have done by way of cooperation to prevent
that disappointment. On the other hand, had the consumer bought for
the ulterior motive of reselling the thing purchased at a higher price,
the law could not regard this motive as the reason for which he bought,
unless he manifested this particular motive to the seller. 8'

184. Id. at 435-37. See also H. Capitant, supra note 45, at 209-10.
185. 1 S. Litvinoff, supra note 10, at 437.
186. Id.
187. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2520 and 2531.
188. See La. Civ. Code art. 1949; 3 C. Toullier, supra note 163, at 329; articles 1825
and 1826 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
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The situation of a merchant, or professional seller, is of course
different. Such a party buys with the intent of reselling in a given market
at a profit, rather than consuming the things he buys in the course of
his business. His motive, reason, or cause is the profit to be made
through reselling at a higher price.'8 9 A necessary presupposition to the
achievement of that goal is the existence of a given market or markets
for the goods involved. The existence of markets is an important part
of the motivation that prompted him to buy. It is clear that such
motivation is known to the other party, even if not expressed, especially
if the other party is also a merchant.190 The same reflexion applies to
a merchant who contracts to. meet the requirements of another party
with an expectation of profit to be made out of goods of a certain
source of supply. The existence of that source is, in such a case, a
necessary presupposition to the attainment of that party's goal.
In either case, an error made on a fact on which the attainment
of a party's contractual end depends is an error that concerns the cause
of the party's obligation.' 9' When cause is viewed in the perspective of
the parties' communicated or otherwise understood reasons, the conclusion is clear that a prediction, which is, of course, an intellectual
representation, may very well bear an operative error when such prediction has determined the will of the two parties, or of one of them
to the knowledge of the other.
The connection of error, force majeure, and impossibility of performance is thus established. 92
The Louisiana Jurisprudence
Louisiana courts do not hesitate in bestowing the nature of operative
error to an event that does not precede, nor is contemporaneous, but
is rather subsequent, to the contract and, therefore, is only a "prediction" at the time the contract is entered. Thus, one decision asserts
that, "Failure of the parties to a contract to buy and sell to anticipate
a lack of governmental approval of the purchaser's planned use of the
property has previously been held to constitute error in the principal

189. See I J. Garrigues, Curso de derecho mercantil 22 (1976).
190. See La. Civ. Code art. 1949 comment c.
191. To avoid terminological confusion, revised article 1967 of the Louisiana Civil
Code defines cause in terms of reason rather than motive. As explained in comment b
to that article, that substitution of words was effected in order to make the Louisiana
doctrine of cause more consistent with its source, as Toullier spoke of motif (motive) as
pourquoi (why an obligation is assumed); see 3 C. Toullier, supra note 163, at 378. In
such a context, "motive" and "reason" are practically interchangeable, though it is quite
clear that "reason" is closer than "motive" to the approach taken by modern and
contemporary French doctrine, which speaks of "cause" in terms of but (end or goal);
see H. Capitant, supra note 45, at 5; 1 S. Litvinoff, supra note 10, at 388-96.
192. See L. Rezzonico, supra note 12, at 125-30; E. Farnsworth, supra note 19, at
697-98.
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cause of the contract ... failure to anticipate an unreasonable and
indefinite delay in governmental approval should lead to the same result,
as fulfillment of the principal cause is equally impossible. For that
reason we find: (1) performance of the contract within a reasonable
time was a principal cause of the contract; (2) this cause was apparent
both from the inherent nature of an agreement of purchase and sale
of real estate and from the circumstances surrounding this particular
contract; (3) the cause cannot be fulfilled due to events beyond the
control of either party; and (4) the parties' failure to anticipate the
unreasonable delay was error of fact sufficient to vitiate their consent
and invalidate the contract."' 93
In the preceding quotation, in crystal clear form, the Louisiana court
asserts that a "failure to anticipate," hardly distinguishable from a
wrong prediction, is an error of fact, thereby rejecting the common law
distinction received in the Louisiana Power & Light case. On the other
hand, the Louisiana court speaks of "impossibility of fulfillment of the
principal cause" in terms that are equally descriptive of impracticability
or frustration of purpose.
In another case, plaintiff sued for the specific performance of an
agreement to purchase a house.194 The court found that plaintiff-vendor
knew that the reason that prompted defendant to enter the agreement
was the fact that defendant's employer wanted him to move closer to
the site of his work, but the order to move was rescinded by the
employer after the defendant had entered the agreement. The court
dismissed plaintiff's action, saying in passing that defendant made good
faith efforts to fulfill the buy-sell agreement as long as his motive for
entering the agreement was intact. 95 Here the distinction between the
contractual object, namely the house purported to be sold, and the
cause of defendant's obligation to take delivery of and pay for the
house was made glaringly clear by the court.
In one decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that failure
to obtain a liquor license for the operation of a bar and lounge constitutes an error of fact as to the principal cause which effects invalidation
of the contract. 96 Another Louisiana court has held that a party's wrong
prediction concerning the sufficiency of certain funds for the purpose
of paying a mortgage note constitutes an operative error of fact.' "9 It
is unquestionable, in all such cases, that, in the mind of Louisiana
courts, a material error of fact may invalidate a contract even if it is

193. Walker v. Don Coleman Constr. Co., 338 So. 2d 1183, 1186 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1976) (emphasis added).
194. Carpenter v. Williams, 428 So. 2d 1314 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
195. Id. at 1317.
196. Marcello v. Bussiere, 284 So. 2d 892 (La. 1973).
197. Jones v. DeLoach, 317 So. 2d 240 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
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uncovered only in the light of a supervening event.
Error and Theorie de L 'Imprivision
The connection between error and theorie de l'impr~vision has, of
course, been detected in French legal literature. Thus, a distinguished
French authority does not hesitate in defining "impr~vision" as an error
involving the economic development of the contract. 98 It has been
observed, however, that, as a matter of principle, error concerns the
formation of contracts while "impr6vision" concerns performance.
Nevertheless, it was immediately added that in practical terms, where
the mind of the parties is concerned, it is very difficult, if not simply
impossible, to distinguish intellectual representations of the future from
those of the past or of the present.' 99
The symmetry between contemporary developments at common law
and civil law is thus enhanced.
The wider scope of cause in the context of error, as explained
earlier,l ° clearly shows that to be operative, error need not involve only
the other party's counterperformance. Error does not come to the rescue
only of those who are not receiving what they expected from a contract,
such as a purchaser who bought the wrong thing. On the contrary, as
error must inhere to the parties' primary motivation-the principal causeit is operative also when it involves a performance promised on the
basis of a wrong assumption.2"'
From the Louisiana jurisprudence it is clear that a contract may be
invalidated when only one of the parties made an error in estimating
20 2
the performance expected from him under such contract.
The Limits of Foreseeability; Damages, Risk, and Sharing of Loss
In sum, where error is concerned the law has not distinguished
between facts which are unknown but presently knowable and facts
which presently exist but are unknowable.0 3 Something which presently
exists but is at the time unknowable is bound to strike with the same
devastating effects as a fortuitous event or irresistible force. Such is the
case of a natural gas-reserve base generally believed to be practically
inexhaustible at a certain moment, but proved to be insufficient by the
supervening effects of changes in government policies, international crisis,
and unprecedented market changes.
198. B. Clice, supra note 177, at 217.
199. J. Ghestin, supra note 171, at 63, n. 70.
200. See supra text p. 40.
201. See J. Ghestin, supra note 171, at 280-81.
202. See North Development Co., v. McClure, 276 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1973).
203. Compare Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906 (1864) with Sherwood v. Walker,
66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887); see also ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 64.
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By way of example, although the cause-effect relation in the extraordinary alteration of prices brought about by international crisis or
international conflagration should be known to a prudent administrator,
there is no reason for him to foresee the occurrence of a crisis or
conflagration which upsets domestic or world markets. That kind of
foresight escapes the prudence of a standard prudent administrator. The
24
Louisiana jurisprudence is well aware of that conclusion. 0
Objections may be voiced against the views just expressed, on grounds
that they permit a certain leniency towards defaulting obligors, particularly in light of the fact that failure in the performance of obligations
may be prompted, perhaps, by dishonest calculations and, therefore, are
to be regarded with distrust. Such an objection, however, can be made
only in total disregard for the ideas underlying article 1996 of the
Louisiana Civil Code and articles 1150 and 1151 of the Code Napoleon
which, in limiting the liability of an obligor in good faith to the reparation of damages that were or should have been foreseen, assert
that, to some degree, losses must be shared between the parties rather
than overburdening the obligor alone. Whenever force majeure strikes,
the business of the parties takes a bad turn. That either party should
get all or nothing is not a fair solution. A sharing of loss is more in
keeping not only with human limitations, but with social needs as well. 25
The need for solutions that allow a fair sharing of loss, or an
equitable allocation of risk, between parties to a contract of long duration
is advocated not only by modern French doctrine but also by German
and Anglo-American decisions and doctrinal opinion. Thus, through a
very adept judicial understanding of the obligation of good faith prescribed in article 242 of the German Civil Code, German courts reached
the conclusion that several customers of a supplier of goods form a
community of risk among themselves and that the supplier's available
stock must be apportioned among such customers if unforeseen events
prevent the availability of goods in a quantity sufficient to deliver the
full amount owed by the supplier to each customer. 26 At common law,
eminent authority has expressed that, "We can not lay down one simple
and all-controlling rule. . . .The problem is that of allocating, in the
most generally satisfactory way, the risk of harm and disappointment
that result from supervening events. ' 20 7 In some instances, American
courts have spoken in terms of a judicial duty to apportion risks.208
That is so because in every fully developed legal system the diligence

204. See McLemore v. Louisiana State Bank, 91 U.S. 27, 23 L. Ed. 196 (1875).
205. See 6 R. Demogue, supra note 2, at 571.
206. See 84 RGZ 125 (1914); 95 RGZ 264 (1919).
207. 6 A. Corbin on Contracts § 1322, at 256 (1962).
208. See Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944); see also Patterson,
The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 Colum. L. Rev. 335
(1924); Smit, supra note 39.
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owed by an obligor in performing his obligation cannot be but a compromise between the absolute expectations of the obligee and the practical
difficulties involved in rendering the performance. The social and economic cost of any other solution is unbearably high.20 9
V.

UNEXPECTED CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

The Approach
When unexpected changes of circumstance greatly affect the performance of contractual obligations, the resulting conflict can be analyzed from the vantage point of the intent of the parties at the time
of contracting. For that purpose, clear guidance is contained in the
articles of the Louisiana Civil Code pertaining to interpretation of contracts.
Ascertaining Mutual Intent
According to article 2045 of the Louisiana Civil Code, interpretation
of a contract is, precisely, the determination of the common intent of
the parties. 2 0 Article 2046 provides, "When the words of a contract
are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further
interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent." ' 21 According
to article 2054, however, "When the parties made no provision for a
particular situation, it must be assumed that they intended to bind
themselves not only to the express provisions of the contract, but also
to whatever the law, equity, or usage regards as implied in a contract
of that kind or necessary for the contract to achieve its purpose. '"2"2
Article 2051 provides, on the other hand, that, "Although a contract
is worded in general terms, it must be interpreted to cover only those
things it appears the parties intended to include." ' 231 Louisiana courts
have never hesitated in recognizing and enforcing those principles. 241
Some Louisiana decisions assert that to determine the mutual intent of
parties, a particular provision of a contract must be viewed as a pinpoint
of light in a broader spectrum which is the entire document. 215
According to those articles, unless the words of a contract concerning
a particular situation are quite clear, Louisiana courts must examine all
circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract in order to

209. See Tunc, supra note 101, at 247. See also, Trakman, supra note 142.
210. See La. Civ. Code art. 2045 comment a.
211. See article 1945(3) of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
212. See La. Civ. Code art. 2054 comment a; see also 6 M. Planiol & G. Ripert,
Trait6 pratique de droit civil franqais 485 (Esmein 2d ed. 1952).
213. See article 1959 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
214.

See, e.g., Superior Oil v. Cox, 307 So. 2d 350 (La. 1975).

215. Lambert v. Maryland Cas. Co., 418 So. 2d 553 (La. 1982); Arvie v. Southern
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
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discern the mutual intent of the parties. In an interesting case, thus,
an agreement had been made between a seller of oil and a sugar
manufacturer whereby the latter, plaintiff, would purchase a large quan2 6
tity of oil with the privilege of buying an additional large quantity. 1
Though not expressed, the parties had contemplated the sale to cover
only the quantity of oil necessary to run plaintiff's plant. When the
price of oil escalated, plaintiff demanded of seller's assignee the full
quantity of barrels, though not all was to be used to run the factory.
Although the language of the contract seemed clear, the court insisted
upon examining the circumstances behind the agreement and found that
the terms of the contract should be viewed in light of the conditions
that existed at the time of the agreement and should take into account
what could be reasonably believed to have been in the minds of the
parties at that time. The court held the seller not liable for the alleged
failure to furnish the full amount of oil. 2 7 Additionally, it has been
said in one decision that, "A venerable principle under Louisiana contract
law is that a contract must be construed in light of the condition and
surrounding circumstances existing at the time of contracting, together
with the terms and language used." 2
Louisiana courts have held that when the parties fail to contemplate
intervening contingencies, the court should not construe the contract so
as to work hardship on one of the parties when that can be avoided
without defeating the intention of the parties at the time of execution.
In one case, a mineral lease between the parties provided a one-eighth
royalty free of cost on all the oil, gas, and gasoline produced. After
execution of the lease, deep wells rich in gas suitable for gasoline
production were discovered. Though extraction of gasoline from that
kind of gas is extremely costly, the lessor demanded his one-eighth
royalty free of cost. Noting that such a construction of the contract
had not been initially contemplated and would work hardship on the
lessee, the court allowed that party to deduct the cost of extraction. 2 '
In a case where the contract was unambiguous, but unforeseen
contingencies had occurred, the court concluded that usages of the trade
in that particular area should substitute for the omitted expression of
the parties' intent. 22 °1 That conclusion is now supported by article 2055
of the Louisiana Civil Code.

216. Adeline Sugar Factory v. Evangeline Oil Co., 121 La. 961, 46 So. 935 (1908).
217. Id.at 979, 46 So. at 941.
218. Continental Oil Co. v.Crutcher, 434 F.Supp. 464, 471 (E.D.La. 1977); Coyle
v.Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co., 175 La. 990, 1007, 144 So. 737, 742 (1932).

219. Coyle v. Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co., 175 La. 990, 144 So. 737 (1932). See also
Ascension Red Cypress Co. v. New River Drainage Dist., 149 La. 764, 90 So. 165 (1921).
220. See Moore v. Johnston, 8 La. Ann. 488 (1852); Sheets v. Robin, 380 So. 2d
137 (La. App. 1stCir. 1979).

19851

THEORIE DE L 'IMPREVISION

Omission and Decision
Whether the parties have been silent concerning a certain contingency
is a question that cannot be answered without exploring the expectations
of the parties. Indeed, the parties form their expectations in relation to
a limited number of situations which they deem significant and which
they select from a larger number of foreseeable ones. "As to those
situations that are excluded by this process of selection, there is an
absence of expectation. When they reduce their expectations to contract
language, a second process of selection takes place, and they use their
language only in connection with a limited number of the significant
situations with respect to which they formed their expectations. As to
the rest, there is an understatement of expectation. A situation that does
not survive these processes of selection is a 'casus omissus.' The process
of determining whether there is a 'casus omissus' is that of inference,
based either on actual expectations or on general principles of fairness
and justice. So where a dispute over omission concerns the qualification
of a duty that has been expressed without qualification, a court must
first determine by the process of interpretation whether the case at hand
was one of the significant situations with respect to which the court
should recognize that it is within its power to extend the duty by analogy
to the case at hand, to refuse to extend it, or to reach an adjustment
22
that lies between these extremes."1 '

Those methods are a part of the process of judicial decision-making

2
22
under any Western system of law.

That approach has a clear importance to the problem of unanticipated circumstances. Inasmuch as, in the typical case of frustration,
the supervening events were neither foreseen nor reasonably foreseeable,
the terms of the contract cannot be interpreted to continue their applicability in the changed situation, even though, on their face, they might
seem to do so. Swiss, German, English, and American courts have
reached such a conclusion when faced with contractual situations of that
sort.223
Some Louisiana decisions contain a clear indication that Louisiana
courts also believe that situations which the parties did not contemplate
24
escape the purview of a contract.
It is clear, thus, that even without altering traditional notions of
force majeure or impossibility, or without admitting new doctrines that

221. Farnsworth, Omission in Contracts, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 860 (1968).
222. See J. Cueto-Rua, Judicial Methods of Interpretation of the Law 29-42 (LSU
Paul M. Hebert Law Center 1981).
223. See Smit, supra note 39, at 293-96, 297-98, 306, 310-13; Aubrey, supra note 33,
at 1177-82.
224. See The Queen of the East, 12 F. 165 (C.C. 1882); Moore v. Johnson, 8 La.
Ann. 448 (1852); McCann & Harper Drilling Co. v. Busch-Everett Co., 131 La. 888, 60
So. 605 (1913).
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account for the consequences of unexpected circumstances, courts are
able to use centuries-old principles of interpretation of contracts as a
ground for relief whenever fairness demands a remedy for an obligor
whose burden has become exceedingly onerous because of circumstances
beyond his control, which amounts, in a way, to a restoration of rebus
sic stantibus.
VI.

UNEXPECTED CIRCUMSTANCES

AS AN EXCUSE

IN OTHER CIVILIAN JURISDICTIONS

Spain
Article 1105 of the Civil Code of Spain contains a classical version
of force majeure, that is, an obligor is not liable for a failure to perform
caused by an event that could be neither foreseen nor resisted. For half
a century after the enactment of that code in 1889, Spanish courts
asserted that only absolute impossibility could give rise to force majeure
as an excuse, thus they adhered to the traditional approach. In 1951,
however, in a decision involving a long-term contract of transportation,
the Tribunal Supremo, the Spanish Supreme Court, took into account
both the long duration of the contract and the increase in the cost of
freight and read a rebus sic stantibus into the contract in order to
conclude that a contract must be adjusted when a supervening change
of circumstances alters the economic foundation of the contract and
upsets the balance originally existing between the parties' reciprocal
2
performances. 25
In 1953, the same tribunal held that a party had committed no breach of contract when, because of black-outs and restrictions
on the use of electric power, only thirty percent of the wooden boxes
2 26
promised by that party could be manufactured and delivered.
Through those decisions, and others, it is clear that the Supreme
Court of Spain has departed from the orthodox approach to force
majeure and has made the notion of impossibility remarkably flexible
through a doctrine having some "impracticability" overtones.

Italy
Article 1225 of the Italian Civil Code of 1865, as its model in the
Code Napoleon, contained a rule that reflected the traditional approach
to force majeure. Nevertheless, in a celebrated decision rendered in 1916,
the court of the city of Turin concluded that in contracts providing for
a series of future acts of performance over a period of time, the clause
rebus sic stantibus is always implied and, therefore, when a change in
circumstances has considerably increased the burden of one party's per-

225. See 17 Repertorio de la jurisprudencia civil espanola (J.C. Espan] 453 (1951); 2
J. Puig Brutau, supra note 8, at 378.
226. See 18 J.C. Espan. 366-67 (1953); 2 J. Puig Brutau, supra note 8, at 378-79.
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formance such contracts may be either dissolved, or modified in order
to alleviate the consequences of the change.22 7 That conclusion was
228
reasserted in many other decisions that followed.
The Revised Italian Civil Code of 1942, sensitive to those jurisprudential developments, provides now in its article 1664, "If as a result
of unforeseeable circumstances such increases or reductions occur in the
cost of materials or of labor as to cause an increase or reduction of
more than one-tenth of the total price agreed upon, either party may
request that the price be revised ....
If in the course of the work,
difficulties appear that derive from geological conditions, water, or other
similar causes not foreseen by the parties, which make the performance
of one party considerably more onerous, that party is entitled to just
compensation therefor. '"229
Greece
Before the enactment of a civil code in 1946, nonperformance of
a contract was a matter governed in Greece by the Roman law as
developed by the Pandectist school in the nineteenth century. 20 Responding to the influence of German jurisprudence and doctrine, some
Greek courts resorted to pacta sunt servanda in order to grant relief to
obligors when the performance of their contractual obligations had become extremely more difficult by virtue of unforeseen changes of circumstances .23
It is against such a background that article 388 of the Greek Civil
Code of 1946 addresses the problem of frustration of contract in a
manner that reflects the influence of the French Imprvision and also
the German doctrine of good faith. 2 2 That article provides, "If, according to good faith and business practices, the parties have entered
a synallagmatic contract under circumstances that have changed because
of extraordinary reasons which could not have been foreseen, and, as
a result of such change, the obligor's performance, also with regard to
the counter-performance, has become excessively burdensome, the court

227. See 1921 Foro It. 1 737. For a discussion of classical Italian doctrine that gives
ample support to the conclusion reached in that decision, see 3 Enciclopedia Giuridica
Italiana Pt. Ill Sec. 2.
228. See F. Messineo, Dottrina generale del contratto 508-514 (1952); L. Rezz6nico,
supra note 12, at 54-56.
229. For interesting commentaries to that article, see 4 F. Stolfi & G. Stolfi, II nuovo
codice civile Pt. 11 167-69 (1952).
230. By Royal Decree of February 23, 1835 the civil law of the Byzantine emperors,
as contained in the Hexabiblos of Harmenopoulos was proclaimed in force until the
enactment of a civil code; see P. Zepos, Greek Law 80 (1949). See also Weiss, E.
Griechisches Privatrecht 219-41 (1965).
231. See Zepos, Frustration of Contract in Comparative Law and in The New Greek
Civil Code of 1946, 11 Mod. L. Rev. 36, 41 (1948).
232. Id. at 41-45.
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may, at the obligor's request, reduce such performance to reasonable
proportions based on its own evaluation, or even declare the contract
dissolved in whole or in that part not yet performed."
Poland
The different codes in force in Poland before enactment of the
Polish Code of Obligations of 1935 strongly adhered to pacta sunt
servanda, as that principle was then deemed indispensable for the protection of the security of transactions. As a consequence, increased
difficulty of a performance resulting from an unexpected change of
circumstances was not operative as an excuse for the obligor, who was
entitled to relief only in case of absolute impossibility of performance. 33
Nevertheless, in search of a solution for the pressing problems which
originated in the crisis that ensued after World War I, the highest
tribunal of Poland developed a jurisprudential doctrine that allowed
relief in cases of relative, rather than absolute, impossibility of performance. According to the origin of the law applicable to each case,
the court resorted, for that purpose, to different sets of concepts such
as good faith, abuse of rights, frustration of the contractual basis or
equivalence of the parties' respective performances.2 14 That creative work
of the Polish Supreme Court received legislative formulation in article
269 of the Polish Code of Obligations of 1934 which provides, "When
as a result of extraordinary circumstances such as war, epidemic, total
loss of crops, or other natural cataclysm the performance of an obligation
has become excessively difficult or would force one of the parties to
sustain an exorbitant loss not contemplated when the contract was
concluded, the court may, if it deems it necessary, according to the
principle of good faith and after taking into consideration the interest
the performance,
of both parties, establish the manner and the extent of
23
or even pronounce the dissolution of the contract. 1
Argentina
Receptive to views expressed by distinguished writers, Argentine
courts developed their version of Impr'vision according to which relief
is granted to an obligor in situations of relative impossibility of performance, that is, when because of unexpected changes of circumstance,
performance, though not absolutely impossible, has become extremely

233. See Niboyet, supra note 58, at 9.
234. See Longchamps de Berier, La revision des contrats par le juge dans le droit
polonais, Travaux de la semaine internationale de droit 105, 110-17 (1937).
235. A treatise by Przybylowski on the effect of changed circumstances on the binding
force of contracts, published in Lwow in 1926, where all the Polish legal literature on
that subject is summarized, became very influential at the time the code of obligations
was in the drafting stage; see id. at 112.
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onerous for the obligor.23 6 That was done on the basis of a civil code
article prescribing that contracts bind the parties not only to whatever
is expressly provided therein but also to whatever may be regarded as
virtually comprised in them.237 From there, the conclusion was reached
that, just as there is no consent when error vitiates it, a party cannot
be presumed to have consented to perform in the face of changes of
circumstance that increase the burden of the performance. 38 The result
is deemed to have been an expansion of the scope of the traditional
doctrine of force majeure.23 9
As a consequence of those jurisprudential developments, when revision of the Argentine Civil Code was undertaken, article 1198 was
amended in 1968, so that it now reads, "Contracts must be executed,
interpreted and performed in good faith and according to that which
is likely the parties have or should have understood had they acted with
care and foresight. In bilateral commutative contracts, unilateral onerous
contracts and commutative contracts of continuous or deferred performance, if the performance of one party becomes excessively onerous
because of extraordinary events that could not have been foreseen, the
party thus burdened may seek the dissolution of the contract. The same
principle shall be applied to aleatory contracts when the excessive onerousness is the result of causes unrelated to the risk involved in such
contracts. In contracts of continuous performance their dissolution may
not impair those effects which have been already accomplished. Dissolution may not be granted when the overburdened party has been
negligent or has fallen into default. The other party may prevent the

236. See E. Cardini, La teoria de laimprevisi6n (1937); E. Cardini, La Lesi6n sobreviniente (1961); L. Rezz6nico, supra note 12; Carlomagno, La teoria de laimprevisi6n
en los contratos y en el derecho en general, [1933] 43 J.A. 18; Fornieles, La clausula
Rebus Sic Stantibus, 1942 J.A. IV 9; Orgaz, El contrato y ladoctrina de laimpr6vision,
[1950] 60 La Ley 691; see also Dursi v. Teitelbaum, 1964 J.A. V 286 (Ct. App. B.A.
1964); Ferrari v. Santa Rosa Estancias, 1965 J.A. IV 413 (Ct. App. B.A. 1964); Cabal
v. Madero, 1975 La Ley 254 (Ct. App. Nat'l 1953). These are just a few of the many
decisions receiving the doctrine. It must be said, however, that decisions rejecting the
doctrine have also been rendered. It is significant that those decisions where courts have
expressed approval on the clearest of terms very often do not grant relief on grounds
that the strict requirements for operation of the doctrine have not been met, as in the
Ferrari case. It is also noteworthy that, according to a distinguished writer, the basis for
a rebus sic stantibus doctrine can be found in the decision of the Argentina Supreme
Court in Avico v. De laPesa, [19341 48 J.A. 697 where, significantly enough, the court
cites Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 37 S.Ct. 298 (1917) and Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). The Argentine and American cases deal with the constitutionality
of emergency legislation that may impair the obligation of contracts.
237. See article 1198 of the Argentine Civil Code of 1869. See also La. Civ. Code
art. 2053 and article 1903 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825.
238. See Ferrari v. Santa Rosa Estancias, 1965 J.A. IV 413.
239. See Dursi v. Teitelbaum, 1964 J.A. V 286; see also L. Rezz6nico, supra note
12, at 100-07.
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dissolu-tion of the contract by offering to improve his own perform2 40
ance.

Quebec
It has been said that the Code civil de la province de Quebec of
1866 went beyond the Code Napoleon in asserting the sancity of contract, as, for example, in denying a remedy for lesion to persons who
were of legal age at the time of contracting.2 4 Even though, for that
reason, the Quebec jurisprudence has not been generally receptive concerning Thkorie de l'impr'vision, Quebec courts have occasionally granted
relief in situations where a performance has become extremely more
onerous by virtue of unexpected circumstances, as a manner of preserving
the equit of the contract. 42
Against such a background it is especially significant that article 73
of the Draft Quebec Civil Code of 1979 provides, "If unpredictable
circumstances render execution of the contract more onerous, the debtor
is not freed from his obligation. Exceptionally, the court may, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, cancel, resiiate or review
any contract the execution of which would entail excessive prejudice to
either party, as a result of unforeseeable circumstances not imputable
2 43
to him."
The Special Case of Puerto Rico
In the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, as in Louisiana, the basic
private law is contained in a civil code of traditional Continental structure
which is applied and maintained in the context of powerful commonlaw influences. That reason makes the law of Puerto Rico of particular
relevance to Louisiana, since the Puerto Rican experience; for greater
reasons than the experience of other jurisdictions, can serve as guidance
in Louisiana when new paths must be found within the law in order
to find solutions for pressing problems.
As its Spanish ancestor, the Puerto Rican Civil Code of 1902 contains
force majeure provisions patterned after the French model. 244 In the
context of such rules, however, the highest court of Puerto Rico found

240. See G. Borda, supra note 14, at 251-52; J. Llambias, Estudio de lareforma del
codigo civil 307-29 (1969).
241. See J. Baudouin, Le droit civil de laprovince de Quebec 731-32 (1953). See also
article 1012 of the Quebec Civil Code of 1866. In recent times, however, a remedy founded
on lesion has been introduced for the protection of consumers; see L. Baudouin, Les
obligations 133-37 (1983).
242. See Madda v. Demers, 29 B.R. 505 (1920); but see J. Baudouin, Les obligations
224 (1983).
243. See J. Baudouin, Les Obligations 225 (1983).
244. See article 1058 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico as re-enacted in 1930; see also
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3022 (1962).
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that a doctrine of unexpected circumstances readily arises from the civil
code provisions on good faith, contractual fairness, and unjust enrichment.145 Thus, in a Case where a supplier of goods alleged that extreme
and unforeseen scarcity of the goods prevented its performance of the
contract, the court opened the door of Puerto Rican law to lmprbvision.146 The court asserted, for that purpose, that the clause rebus sic
stantibus is unquestionably contained in the overriding obligation of
good faith, especially in the case of contracts of long duration. Spanish
and German doctrine, extensively analyzed by the court, lend support
to that conclusion. 247 The court made it clear that, for relief to be
granted, certain findings are a prerequisite. Thus, unforeseeability of
the changes of circumstance, which is a question of fact, is a fundamental
condition, independent of the other factors operating in each particular
case. An extraordinary difficulty must be shown that renders the conditions of performance more severe and onerous for the obligor, though
without attaining that extraordinary degree of severity that constitutes
absolute impossibility, which is also a question of fact. Assumption of
risk, as the case would be in an aleatory contract, must not have been
a primary purpose of the contract involved in the case. There must be
an absence of bad faith on the part of either party, since bad faith
would constitute either delict or quasi-delict, the effects of which are
already regulated by the law. The contract must involve a series of acts
of performance, or a performance subject to a term, for there is no
room for Imprevision in contracts that are performed immediately. Finally, the unforeseen circumstances must have brought about a change
of a certain permanence, which seems to follow from the extraordinary
248
nature of the change.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

Creation vs. Expansion
The preceding discussion shows different reactions and different
possible solutions to the problems that arise when unexpected changes
of circumstance increase the burden of performing an obligation in a
manner that, exceeding the reasonable contemplation of the parties at
the time the contract was made, threatens the financial stability of the

245. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1769, 1983, and 2055.
246. Casera Foods, Inc. v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 108 P.R. Dec. 850
(1979).
247. Id. at 853-57. See also 3 J. Castan, Derecho civil espanol, comun y foral 548
(1947); 2 J. Puig Brutau, supra note 8, at 372-79.
248. See 108 P.R. Dec. 856-57 (1979). Because some of those prerequisites were absent
in the situation involved in the case, plaintiff was denied relief. See comments to that
case in Echevarria Vargas, Revisi6n contractual por alteraci6n de las circunstancias, 21
Rev. D.P. 202, 215-17 (1981).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

obligor and, as in some of the situations explored, may also threaten
the continuity of indispensable services.
In many continental legal systems, Th'orie de I'imprvision, whose
affinity with the American impracticability of performance has been
discussed, has made deeper inroads than in France, where it originated.
For some authorities, Impr'vision-unforeseen or unexpected circumstances-is another of the manners in which obligations are extinguished,
a new defense, an excuse for nonperformance with an entity of its own
that has to be distinguished from traditional force majeure.2 49 For others,
Impr'vision alludes to difficult problems that differ from those clustered
around force majeure, which justifies the search for a solution through
other avenues such as failure of cause (so similar to frustration of
purpose), error, good faith, contract-interpretation, and even abuse of
right or unjust enrichment.")
Be that as it may, and regardless of precision in the legal foundations, the important thing is the recognition given to unexpected
changes of circumstance as an excuse to be invoked by an overburdened
obligor. It is noteworthy that even staunch supporters of the enforceability of contracts as made by the parties have conceded that when an
obligor's burden reaches a certain degree, it is manifestly unjust to
uphold the contract as originally made, since it is as unfair to profit
from circumstances that were unforeseen at the time of contracting as
it is to profit from the other party's ignorance of circumstances that
existed at that moment."5 ' For the same reason that the doctrine of
vices of consent furnishes a remedy in the latter situation, it has been
said, a remedy is also needed in the former.252
Nevertheless, for the sake of rigor in the conceptual approach, it
cannot be denied that, when operative, unexpected circumstances and
force majeure share the feature of unforeseeability and also share the
obstructive effect. The fact that changes of circumstance, for their vast
generality, may affect many, or all, obligors within a class, while force
majeure may affect only one, can justify a difference of species within
a certain category but not a difference in the category itself. 253 In other
words, an expansion of the scope of the traditional doctrine of force
majeure, especially on account of an increasingly changing world, should
give ample room for unexpected changes of circumstance as an excuse
for nonperformance.254 Articles 1873 and 1875 of the Louisiana Civil

249. See 6 R. Demogue, supra note 2, at 686-89; E. Cardini, Lesi6n sobreviniente 2728 (1961); L. Rezz6nico, supra note 12, at 43-47; P. Voirin, supra note 55, at 1-6.
250. See 3 J. Bonnecase, supra note 11, at 572-93; Smit, supra note 39.
251. See 6 M. Planiol & G. Ripert, supra note 212, at 535; see also A. Weill & F.
Terre, supra note 57, at 420-22.
252. See 6 M. Planiol & G. Ripert, supra note 212, at 535.
253. See 2 J. Puig Brutau, supra note 8, at 363-72.
254. Cf. J. Radouant, supra note 130, at 92-98; see also 2 A. Colin & H. Capitant,
supra note 119, at 94-98.
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Code lend support to that conclusion as a result of having chosen
"fortuitous event" over "irresistible force" as the cause of impossibility.255
In sum, fairness or the public interest are valid reasons that can
still make rebus sic stantibusa viable alternative to pacta sunt servanda,
at least in critical situations.
Dissolution vs. Revision
If extreme difficulty is equated to impossibility as the result of a
more flexible and realistic approach to force majeure, then a contract
should be dissolved when the obligation of one party can no longer be
performed as originally intended. In many situations that solution is the
only one that is reasonable and fair. Dissolution, however, which is the
natural consequence of a fortuitous event that strikes a party's performance according to article 1876 of the Louisiana Civil Code, is not
always the best outcome of the inevitable conflict of interests. Dissolution
may mean the total destruction of the parties' contractual expectations,
while, when unexpected circumstances have exceedingly increased the
burden of a performance, fairness to one of the parties, or both, may
require that the contractual relation be preserved, though not in the
original terms.21 6 Moreover, in some situations, the preservation of the
contractual relation may be required by the public interest or the welfare
of the community.257
Of course, the parties on their own initiative may modify, revise,
25 8
or alter their own contract in exercise of their contractual freedom.
In spite of such an intention they may fail to reach a solution. The
question is whether a revision of the contract may be judicially imposed
upon them. At first blush, contract-revision as a remedy seems to run
counter to the fundamental principle that a contract is the private law
of the parties, which would seem to exclude any judicial interference
with that law.259 The fact is, however, that the civil code itself provides
for a revision of the contract as a solution in some instances. Thus,

255. La. Civ. Code art. 1873: "An obligor is not liable for his failure to perform
when it is caused by a fortuitous event that makes performance impossible." La. Civ.
Code art. 1875: "A fortuitous event is one that, at the time the contract was made,
could not have been reasonably foreseen." Article 1933(2) of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870 provides: "Where, by a fortuitous event or irresistible force, the debtor is hindered
from giving or doing what he has contracted to give or do ....
".Seealso La. Civ.
Code art. 3556(14), (15).
256. See Trakman, supra note 142, at 489-91.
257. See J. Baudouin, Theory of Imprevision and Judicial Intervention to Change a
Contract, in Essays on the Civil Law of Obligations 151, 159 (J. Dainow Ed. 1969); 4 J.
Carbonnier, supra note 16, at 254.
258. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1906 and 1983. See also article 1901 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870.
259. La. Civ. Code art. 1983.
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according to article 1877, when a fortuitous event has made a party's
performance impossible in part, the court may reduce the other party's
counterperformance proportionally, as an alternative to the dissolution
of the contract.16° That is consistent with the solution propounded in
article 2455 under the terms of which, if the thing sold is partially
destroyed at the time of contracting, the purchaser has the choice of
keeping that part of the thing that has been preserved and having a
new price determined by appraisement. According to article 2012, a
court may modify a stipulation of damages made by the parties, when
such damages are manifestly unreasonable and contrary to public order. 26
In the clear words of article 2543, in an action for rescission on grounds
of redhibition, the court may decree a reduction of the price thereby
unholding the contract, though not in its original terms. Under certain
circumstances, in an action for judicial dissolution, article 2013 allows
the court to grant additional time to an obligor who failed to perform
262
thereby modifying the contractual term.
In other instances, modification of the contract is a choice the law
gives to a party as an alternative to rescission or dissolution. In the
case of lesion, article 2591 prescribes that if it should appear that
immovable property has been sold for less than one half of its fair
value, the purchaser may either restore the thing and take back the
price which he has paid, or improve that price to make it fair and keep
the thing. That is now consistent with article 1951 according to which
rescission on grounds of error may not be granted if the other party
is willing to perform the contract as intended by the party in error.
Also, under article 2697, if a leased thing is destroyed in part, the lessee
may either demand a diminution of the price or dissolution of the

contract .263
Written provisions aside, Louisiana courts have asserted on several
occasions that, when a fortuitous event has thwarted the parties' expectations, an effort should be made by the court to restructure or rebalance the obligations of the parties, so as to place them as nearly as
264
possible in equal positions.
It is clear, thus, that the idea that a contract may be revised by a
court is not alien to the civil code. It appears, in that context, that the

260. See A. Levasseur, Pr&is in Conventional Obligations: A Civil Code Analysis 79
(1980). Also, Averette v. Jordan, 457 So. 2d 691, 701-02 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
261. See American Leasing Co. v. Lannon E. Miller & Son, General Contracting,
Inc., 469 So. 2d 325 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
262. See G. Ripert, supra note 15, at 142-43, where the importance of contract-revision
in connection with the rule mentioned in the text above is commented upon. See also 2
S. Litvinoff, supra note 121, at 513-14; L. Rezz6nico, supra note 12, at 115-16.
263. See A. Levasseur, supra note 260, at 79.
264. Averette v. Jordan, 457 So. 2d 691, 702 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); see also
Richardson v. Cole, 173 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965); Acosta v. Cole, 178 So.
2d 456 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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principle that makes of a contract the private law of the parties assumes
normality in the life of a contract. When that normality is severely
altered because of unexpected changes in circumstance, an adjustment
of the contract to the altered circumstances is actually a manner of
going back to the original will of the parties whom should always be
presumed to have intended to make a contract that will subsist rather
than collapse. In the words of a distinguished French writer, a doctrine
that allows revision, far from destroying contracts, actually restores them
2 65
to their real and effective scope.
Of course, one thing is a contract-modification that consists in
determining a new price for a partially destroyed thing or allowing
additional time for an obligor to perform, and another is the modification of a contract of long duration the clauses of which may contain
extremely complicated technical or economic formulae. Even for such
situations, however, it is possible to develop suitable methods.2 66 On the
other hand, knowledge that a court may exercise such a power may be
the best stimulation for parties to reach an adjustment by their own
means, and to introduce in their future contracts devices that will force
them to negotiate solutions in good faith.267
Be that as it may, the judicial revision of contracts other than those
governed by administrative law has been rejected in France. 261 Besides
the alleged encroachment upon the sanctity of contract, another reason
for that rejection is the danger of too much judicial discretion.2 69 To
that, a distinguished French authority responded that a judge is more
than a mere interpreter of contracts, that in deeply delving into the
parties' intent in order to bestow meaning upon their contract a judge
becomes a collaborator of the parties, a wise administrator whose dis7
cretion should never be feared.1
To conclude, sight should not be lost of the fact that civil law is
not only French law. It has been shown earlier that in other ambits of
the civilian world, a doctrine of unexpected circumstances that propounds
judicial revision of contracts as a remedy has been developed on the
27
basis of centuries-old civilian principles.

265.

M. Morin, La loi et le contrat 49-50 (1927).

266.

See Trakman, supra note 142, at 500-06. See also Dawson, Judicial Review of

Frustrated Contracts, 1982 Jurid. Revue 86; Rose, Restitution and Frustration,
L.i. 955 (1981).
267. See David, supra note 57, at 14. See La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 191.

268.

131 New

See J. Baudouin, Theory of Imprevisi6n and Judicial Intervention to Change a

Contract, in Essays on the Civil Law of Obligations 151, 157-60 (J. Dainow ed. 1969); R.

David, English Law and French Law: A Comparison in Substance 123-25 (1980).
269. For an excellent discussion of the objection referred to in the text, see L.
Rezz6nico, supra note 12, at 112-15.
270. 2 R. Demogue, supra note 153, at 493-94. See also G. Ripert, supra note 15,
at 142-43.
271.
See supra text pp. 52-57.
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Limitations
When not specifically provided by law, the remedy of contractrevision, because of its extraordinary nature, must be used sparingly,
prudently, and applied only to extremely serious situations. Certain
findings are indispensable for that purpose, to wit:
(1) The facts or events that brought about changes of circumstances
and call for application of rebus sic stantibus must be so extraordinary
and abnormal as to have escaped the foreseeability of prudent parties.
If such events or changes were foreseeable, then the conclusion must be
that the obligor assumed the pertinent risk."'
(2) The consequences of the unexpected changes must be of such
an importance as to allow the conclusion that the obligor would not
have bound himself if those changes had been foreseeable. The balance
between the parties' respective performances must be drastically altered
273
as the result of the greatly increased onerousness of one.
(3) The unexpected changes must have produced consequences of
vast generality that affect whole categories of obligors, as it is the case
with the economic consequences of war, or inflation, or depletion of
the sources of certain supplies.274
(4) The contract involved must be one providing for a series of acts
of performance over a certain period of time, or for a performance
deferred in time. In either case, time is the factor that allows a change
to occur. 275 In contracts of instantaneous or immediate performance, a
manifest lack of balance between what the parties give and receive may
276
be cured through other remedies.
(5) The contract involved must be commutative, that is, not aleatory,
in which case it may be assumed that the obligor assumed the risk of
2 77
extraordinary contingencies.
The General Interest
Technical requirements aside, the most important consideration on
which the granting of an extraordinary remedy-either judicially or by
legislative fiat-must be based is an awareness of the consequences that
may follow if only ordinary remedies are allowed in certain situations.
Indeed, if upon an unquestionably clear showing that the difficulties
encountered by an obligor truly amount to impossibility dissolution is

272. See L. Rezz6nico, supra note 12, at 38-40.
273. The balance may be altered also if the onerousness of one performance is suddenly
greatly decreased as when, because of inflation, a purchaser who was granted a term to
pay the price pays it in depreciated currency; see A. Morello & Tr6ccoli, La revision del
contrato 101-20 (1977). See also K. Rosenn, Law and Inflation 84-93 (1982).
274. See L. Rezz6nico, supra note 12, at 39.
275. See 6 R. Demogue, supra note 2, at 697.
276. See 6 M. Planiol & G. Ripert, supra note 212, at 537-38.
277. Id.
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granted of a contract of long duration for the supply of goods indispensable to render a service to the community, interruption of the service
may then ensue. Preservation of the continuity of public services is the
ultimate justification for Th'orie de I'imprvision in French law."' On
the other hand, if specific performance is granted upon a conclusion
that an increase of the burden of performing an obligation, even though
excessive, does not amount to absolute impossibility, the obligor may
be reduced to a situation of actual or virtual financial ruin with the
attending impact on large numbers of workers, the contractual expectations of third parties and, again, the community at large.27 9 It has
been said, in that context, that rather than a mere source of private
rights, contracts are instruments protected by the law for the satisfaction
of human needs through the creation and distribution of wealth, and
instruments of that kind cannot be viewed as rigid when stricken by
20
extraordinary change. 8

278. See F. B~noit, supra note 51, at 628; 4 J. Carbonnier, supra note 16, at 260;
6 R. Demogue, supra note 2, at 688; A. Weill & F. Terr6, supra note 57, at 428.
279. See Trakman, supra note 142, at 485-86.
280. See 6 R. Demogue, supra note 2, at 697.

